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... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Bill of Rights – Fifth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution
1 Introduction
What are the long-term consequences of common law institutions on growth and inequal-
ity? Cross-country empirics attribute 30% greater stock-market-to-GDP ratios and stronger
property rights to common law as opposed to civil law regimes (La Porta et al. 2008), which
suggests that the common law can have important effects on economic outcomes through
property law. We examine the causal impact of governments’ power of expropriation of pri-
vate property rights on growth and inequality and we measure the channels through which
government power has its effects.
A key economic rationale for government expropriation is the failure of Coasean bargaining
among numerous property rights owners: Subjective valuation exceeding objective valuation
will stymie socially optimal outcomes. Under this view, government power of expropriation
leads to economic growth. Yet excessive subjective valuation also occurs when there are high
human costs of forced displacement. In India and China, government decisions to expropriate
land have led to violent riots. In China alone, the government has taken land from an
estimated 40 million households, many of whom have been under-compensated and as a
result remain landless, unemployed, and politically restless (Cao et al. 2008). In the former
Soviet bloc, legislation allowing governments to expropriate land for the establishment of
privately-owned industrial parks is pending. And in the U.S., the Charles River Bridge
case of 1837 represents a watershed moment. The Massachusetts government had granted
exclusive property rights to private investors to build a toll bridge for traffic across the
Charles River, but later eviscerated those rights by building a free bridge nearby, which
touched off a dispute in which each side claimed to generate the socially optimal outcome
(Lamoreaux 2011). Variously referred to as “eminent domain” (United States), “compulsory
purchase” (United Kingdom, New Zealand, Ireland), “compulsory acquisition” (Australia),
or simply “expropriation” (South Africa and Canada) in different legal systems, the causal
impact of governmental powers of expropriation remains an open question for development
economics, macroeconomics, urban economics, economic history, and constitutional law.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution states, “. . . nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Court decisions
conducting eminent domain jurisprudence focus on the definition of public use and what
constitutes justifiable expropriation. The definition of public use has broadened over the
twentieth century to include public purpose based on physical, aesthetic, and monetary ben-
efits (Berman v. Parker (1954) held that eradication of blighted neighborhoods qualified as
public purpose); conceiveable public purpose (Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984)
held that a state can take land that is owned by a small group of private landowners and
redistribute it to a wide group of private residents so long as the public purpose be “con-
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ceivable”); and even—economic development (Kelo v. City of New London (2005) held that
a transfer of private property to another private entity for the purpose of economic devel-
opment satisfies the public use requirement). In the last fifty years, judges have decided
hundreds of these cases. Major legal precedents range from the building of government dams
that caused flooding, building sewers that deprived groundwater from wells, and breaking
up oligopolies in land ownership. All of these actions constituted a government taking.
Alongside the birth of the regulatory state, individuals have begun challenging government
regulations and even judicial decisions as takings, which has created novel legal debates on
whether the government can even restrict how a property owner develops his or her prop-
erty. Litigations have arisen over regulations that shorten the fishing year, impose zoning
restrictions on hotels and gambling, and require enclosure of racing tracks. Takings Clause
jurisprudence affects all regulations that potentially restrict how property owners develop
their land or even—potentially diminish the economic value of property (Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon). Regulations that restrict property rights are litigated as government expro-
priation, yet the modern economy has been characterized as the rise of the regulatory state
(Glaeser and Shleifer 2003). The modern administrative state entails regulatory schemes that
routinely reassign property rights. Yet, the effect of this sort of state power on American
government and society is unknown (Hamburger 2014). The U.S. Federal Courts litigate
regulations that can move billions of dollars in stock market prices.1 Between 1999-2014,
Supreme Court decisions moved the market value of publicly traded companies by a net
$140 billion (Katz et al. 2015). This paper examines the causal impact of government power
of expropriation on growth and racial inequality.
Using random assignment and the fact that judges’ biographies predict their decisions, we
examine whether judges making different legal precedents for millions of individuals residing
in one of 12 U.S. Circuits (also known as U.S. Courts of Appeals) matters. Between 1975 and
2008, over 134 Courts of Appeals cases addressing physical takings were decided in the United
States, yielding roughly 107 experiments across 34 years and 12 Circuits. While this number
may seem small, analysis of state laws usually examine the impact of up to 50 experiments in
the U.S. or 34 in the OECD. Since Courts of Appeals are only to hear cases presenting new
legal issues, cases representing big legal changes occur throughout the time period. Because
judicial composition of eminent domain cases is unlikely to be correlated with subsequent
economic outcomes other than through eminent domain decisions, the random assignment
of judges creates exogenous variation in legal precedent that can be used to estimate the
causal impact of court-made eminent domain law on growth and racial inequality.
One of the key identification challenges is that judges may make pro-takings decisions when
there is urban blight, creating downward bias, or when complementary economic growth is
1“Billions of Dollars at Stake in Supreme Court Power Market Fight” (Bloomberg Business, January 19,
2016).
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anticipated, creating upward bias in ordinary least squares estimates between pro-government
takings decisions and subsequent economic outcomes. Data limitations have made it practi-
cally impossible to study the causal effects of eminent domain, which is rarely exercised in a
random fashion. The ideal research design randomly assigns individuals or firms to different
legal rules to help resolve uncertainty about consequential impacts of law (Abramowicz et
al. 2011). Thankfully, individuals are not randomly assigned to different systems of justice,
nor are judges randomizing their decisions, but the random assignment of law-making judges
provides a close approximation.
Even if eminent domain takings were randomized, general equilibrium effects would be
difficult to measure. In addition, few centralized data sources document condemnation: Many
different types of property rights are subject to government takings and many levels of gov-
ernment (local, state, and national) have the power of eminent domain. We address both
issues by focusing on national-level randomization of court-made laws (jurisprudence) that
make it harder or easier for subsequent government actors to “take”. The U.S. common law
system–random assignment of judges, judges interpreting the facts and the law differently
and in a manner correlated with their demographic characteristics, and a system of Circuit
Courts with regional jurisdiction–allows us to isolate causal effects and incorporate general
equilibrium responses. These general equilibrium effects can include (but are not restricted
to) capital and labor migration across Circuits. To be sure, since our unit of analysis is
Circuit-year, we are subject to the usual concern that the Circuit-years are, at first glance,
analyzed as separate markets. However, we note that since our randomization occurs na-
tionally and repeatedly, the general equilibrium effects of labor or capital mobility across
Circuit-years are incorporated into our estimates, and these would be the estimates a judge
may be interested in. The precedents themselves may eventually spill over across Circuits
but it is not immediate, and citation analysis indicates that the precedential impact is an
order of magnitude greater within the Circuit than outside.
Consider Goldstein v. Pataki, which illustrates intuitions. Here, the Second Circuit allowed
New York to take land for a private developer to build a basketball arena to attract the New
Jersey Nets basketball team, which was in the Third Circuit. Fifty years earlier, an attempt
to build a baseball stadium on the same site failed because it was not considered public
use. But the expanded definition of public use allowed the taking, which racial minorities
and small business owners protested, and the last homeowner evicted from the land was
compensated $3 million. Note that migration occurs both across Circuit boundaries (the
basketball team is now called the Brooklyn Nets) and across time (had a baseball stadium
been built, there probably would not be a basketball stadium).
We differ from previous papers analyzing the causal effects of law by proposing an esti-
mation strategy for three separate parameters of policy interest: 1) where the counterfactual
is the opposite precedent (What if Goldstein had been decided the opposite way? This is of
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policy interest to a decision-maker determining a case already in front of him or her.), 2)
where the counterfactual is no precedent (What if Goldstein did not exist? This is of policy
interest to a decision-maker factoring in the decision to appeal.), and 3) the local effects
of the decision (What if Goldstein’s basketball arena did not exist in the original zip codes
where the alleged taking took place? This is of policy interest to a decision-maker considering
a taking) using data collection from both Circuit and District Courts and linking the Circuit
cases to the originating zip code(s).
It is important to note that the U.S. Federal Courts, and in particular, the U.S. Courts
of Appeals, have strong impact on government power of expropriation. Only 2% of Courts
of Appeals cases successfully appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, so U.S. Courts of Appeals
determine the vast majority of decisions that set legal precedent and 98% of their decisions
are final. Their decisions are binding precedent within the Circuit, but not outside. They are
persuasive precedent on the state courts within the Circuit. In all acts of eminent domain, the
government must initiate court proceedings. Regulations that are litigated as expropriation
fall under Circuit jurisdiction. Since the Courts of Appeals judges are revealed substantially
after the briefs are filed and after litigation costs have been sunk at both the District and
Circuit Court level, very few cases settle when the judges are revealed. We also note that
the U.S. Courts of Appeal only handles issues of new law–so we should not expect Courts of
Appeals cases to influence the decision of a subsequent case that appears in the Circuit.2
Guided by the only set of theoretical models in the scientific literature that we are aware
of, we embed conflicting views of eminent domain in a simple model whose predictions are
consistent with the previous models in the literature. We recognize that we do not have
data on every modeling assumption or modeling parameter, so reduced form predictions
isolate the channel through which government takings have their effects. Ex ante, the signs
of the effects of eminent domain laws on subsequent economic outcomes are theoretically
ambiguous. Models in law and economics emphasize how compensation for takings creates
moral hazard for property owners, leading to over-investment because property owners do
not pay the insurance they receive in the event of a taking that makes their investment
generally worthless (Blume, Rubinfeld and Shapiro 1984; Miceli and Segerson 1994; Innes
1997). Property owners may even over-develop to deter government actors from taking their
property instead of someone else’s property. Models in the development literature found that
if governments compensate too little, then the property owner receives less return on his or
her investment, leading to under-investment (Besley 1995; Banerjee et al. 2002; Hornbeck
2010). Models in macroeconomics predict that the extractive capacity of the state (i.e., tax
technology or shadow of expropriation) leads to faster economic growth because of the public
benefits (Mayshar et al. 2011; Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002; Aguiar and Amador 2011). As far
2In any event, when we run the reduced form relationship between previous judicial assignment and future
laws, there is little apparent effect.
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as we are aware, “shadow of expropriation” was first used in the economics literature to model
foreign investment (Aguiar and Amador 2011), but the concept is apt for eminent domain
power since common law precedent involves both the threat and the actual expropriation.
We explore how closely our empirical design emulates a randomized control trial, address-
ing the problems of omitted variables, reverse causality, and identification of the multiyear
response to prior years’ decisions. We verify there are no effects in four years of leads be-
fore the decision, which is an important omnibus check of potential endogeneity in violation
of our research design. We buttress the assumption that demographic characteristics of as-
signed judges in published cases are exogenous, linked to economic outcomes only through
legal precedent, and that the pro-takings/pro-property owner dimension of these cases is
the only channel through which eminent domain doctrine has an effect. We also assuage
common concerns levied against randomized control trials (RCTs)—i) whether the LATE
interpretation of IV estimates is policy relevant and ii) whether general equilibrium effects,
including delayed effects, are incorporated.
We assess whether biographical characteristics not used in the first stage are correlated
with residuals in the second stage regression. They are not, which suggests that either the
pro-takings vs. pro-property owner dimension of these eminent domain cases is the primary
channel through which eminent domain jurisprudence has an effect, or other aspects of
eminent domain jurisprudence are not polarized along judicial demographic characteristics,
which assuages concerns that we pick up something other than pro-takings vs. pro-property
owner doctrine. It also assuages concerns that our identification strategy spuriously picks up
the effects of legal precedent in another area of law. Each Circuit Court decides many thou-
sands of cases per year, so the judicial panel composition in different legal areas is effectively
uncorrelated. Our identification assumption is that the assignment of judicial biographical
characteristics correlated with eminent domain precedent is uncorrelated with other social
trends, legal decisions, or the assignment in other areas of law of judicial biographical char-
acteristics that predict legal decisions and affect economic outcomes. The large number of
biographical characteristics unused in the first stage are equally unlikely to be correlated
with the assignment in other legal areas of judicial biographical characteristics that affect
decisions in that area and affect economic outcomes.
Results are robust to controls for Circuit-specific time trends and composition of the pool
of judges available to be assigned to panels; results are robust to dropping 1 Circuit at a time,
varying the lag structure, and collapsing the data to the Circuit-year level; results are robust
to using wild bootstrap and simulations that randomly assign legal variation to another
Circuit. As Barrios, Diamond, Imbens, and Kolesar (2012) write, “if the covariate of interest is
randomly assigned at the cluster level, only accounting for non-zero covariances at the cluster
level, and ignoring correlations between clusters, leads to valid standard errors and confidence
intervals,” which implies similar standard errors across the different methods of accounting for
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clustering at the Circuit or Circuit-year level. We also present tests of randomization, assess
additional identification concerns, and present robustness to accounting for the potential for
litigants to pursue an appeal in response to prior years’ outcomes. We elaborate on the use of
randomly assigned judges in the lower courts (District Courts) from which an appeal arises
as an additional source of exogenous variation to control for the presence of a case.
Our main findings are that rulings making it easier to take physical property rights spur
economic growth and property values but increase racial inequality, as minorities become
more likely to be displaced, unemployed, and live in public housing. We explore the mech-
anisms using data on federal transportation projects, sectoral GDP, and data entry exper-
iments, and find evidence consistent with all three mechanisms upon which prior theories
built their models: public use, over-investment, and insecure property rights.
As to what range of impact estimates are reasonable, we are guided by the only set of em-
pirical results in the causal inference literature that we are aware of. These papers find that
electrification increased female employment by 9.5 percentage points and population growth
by 17% (Dinkelman 2011), railroad increased income levels by 16% (Donaldson 2015), re-
zoning increased employment by 12-21% and weekly wages by 8-13% (Busso et al. 2013),
cell phone towers increased producer surplus by 8% and consumer surplus by 6% (Jensen
2007), a 1% increase in government purchases caused 1.5% increase in output (Nakamura
and Steinsson 2011), a 1% increase in road length increased GDP by 9% and wages by 11%
(Morten and Oliveira 2013), five years of legislation enabling government acquisitions in-
creased median property values by 4% (Collins and Shester 2011), and randomly assigned
roads increased property values by 16% (Gonzalez-Navarro and Quintana-Domeque 2014).
Roughly 95$ billion is spent per year on place-based policies in the U.S. (Kline and Moretti
2014). It is important to note that these are a subset of all the government activities affected
by Takings Clause jurisprudence. Our paper presents the advantage of being based on ran-
domization that is naturally occurring, where general equilibrium effects are incorporated.
Whether these effects seem large or small depends on one’s perspective: Hacker and Pierson
(2016) argue that government regulations fueled economic growth throughout the twentieth
century and Gary D. Libecap (2011) find that an early form of land regulation in the 19th
century–demarcation–increased property values by up to 30% and had lasting effects persist-
ing across two centuries. The interpretation of these estimates—and ours—is subject to the
usual caveats in the literature (Deaton 2010)—causal effects are sufficient, but not necessary
conditions for an outcome.3
We begin our analysis by documenting that our cases are subsequently cited by state
statutes and treatises inside–but not outside–the Circuit Court’s regional jurisdiction, which
3A defendant who shares the same first initial as a judge receives 8% longer sentences, but this effect only
explains 0.03% variance (Chen and Prescott 2016). See also Deaton’s NYU “Debates in Development” lecture
on the topic, where he describes causal effects as Insufficient but Non-redundant parts of a condition which
is Unnecessary but Sufficient (INUS).
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verifies that Courts of Appeals have persuasive precedent on state courts where most takings
cases are litigated. We next establish that the random composition of judicial panels was
related to Courts of Appeals eminent domain decisions. Judges who are racial minorities
have been found to vote differently from white judges on issues such as affirmative action,
race harassment, unions, and search and seizure cases where racial minorities are dispropor-
tionately affected (Kastellec 2013; Scherer 2004; Chew and Kelley 2009). Racial minorities
have their property disproportionately taken (Carpenter and Ross 2009; Frieden and Saga-
lyn 1991), and minority Democrats were 20 percentage points more supportive of property
owners in eminent domain cases from 1950 to 2008 (we refer to judges appointed by Demo-
cratic presidents as Democrats for brevity). Federal prosecutors represent the government in
Federal Courts, prioritizing which aspects of federal law to enforce on behalf of the govern-
ment. Federal prosecutors are also known as U.S. Attorneys or U.S. District Attorneys (see
references cited in Berdejo and Chen 2016; Chen 2016 on their political decision making).
Republican former federal prosecutors were 18 percentage points more likely to uphold a
physical taking, reflecting both business and government interests.
Next, we show that jurisprudence making it easier for governments to appropriate property
rights affected government actors. Local governments expropriated larger, more expensive
land parcels. Parcels were taken more frequently from businesses despite their being more
litigious and expensive to displace. Highway construction increased both inside central busi-
ness districts and as connections to outlying areas. On net, pro-government eminent domain
precedent spurred annual economic growth and quarterly house-price growth for four years
after the precedent, the largest effects occurring two years after the precedent. Effects on
house prices are larger, consistent with over-investment and house prices being more forward-
looking relative to contemporaneous variables like GDP. Notably, sectoral GDP effects are
concentrated in areas associated with public infrastructure projects: construction, trans-
portation, and governmental. Financial, retail, and agricultural sectors (but not the service
sector) also benefited. Eminent domain precedent also had sizable local effects in the original
zip code(s) where the takings case arose.
Turning to inequality, consistent with studies suggesting that individuals displaced through
eminent domain relocate within a few miles, government power to expropriate increased racial
minority moves within the same county relative to whites, but no such effect was found for
moves outside the county. Racial minorities also became less likely to be employed relative
to whites and more likely to live in public housing, consistent with concerns that eminent
domain projects do not necessarily employ minorities whose homes or employers were ex-
propriated, or that the projects themselves have unequal distributional effects, e.g., in the
seminal study of irrigation dams by Duflo and Pande (2007).
Eminent domain need not be total; it could be partial, as in environmental regulations or
zoning laws that limit how property owners can develop land. Regulatory takings decisions
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in favor of government spur annual economic and quarterly house-price growth and benefit
white-collar sectors such as services, government, and financial services. However, unlike
physical takings, regulatory takings precedent do not displace individuals and, indeed, we
find that they do not lead to condemnations or racial inequality in housing, employment,
or displacement. They also do not affect construction and transportation sectors. The last
result—in our view—is an important manipulation check of the experimental design that
contrasts with the effect of physical takings precedent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model and
conceptual framework, Section 3 our empirical framework, Section 4 the main results, Section
5 the mechanisms, and Section 6 concluding remarks and limitations.
2 Theory
2.1 Eminent DomainGovernments intend the power of eminent domain to spur eco-
nomic growth through the provision of public goods such as highways, utilities, blight re-
moval, and commercial development. These rationales were articulated in the 2005 U.S.
Supreme Court case, Kelo v. City of New London, which justified government transfer of
land from one private owner to another on the basis that commercial development satisfied
the public use requirement of the constitution.
From a theoretical perspective, hold-up problems arise when subjective valuation exceeds
objective valuation, so government expropriation is intended to overcome coordination break-
downs between numerous stakeholders (Buchanan and Yoon 2000). With physical condem-
nation, the government must initiate court proceedings, though typically a purchase offer is
made and bargaining occurs under the shadow of the law. Both residential and commercial
tenants can be affected; some jurisdictions do not authorize eminent domain for residential
properties (Berliner and Coalition 2006). Business owners have noted that re-establishment
expenses are insufficient to cover increased rent and remodeling expenses associated with
displacement (Garnett 2006). Communities have reported concerns about job loss and trou-
ble attracting new businesses after the number of evicted businesses jumped from 39,000 in
1963 to 100,000 in 1971 (Frieden and Sagalyn 1991).
Government compensation for land acquisition has been documented to be lower than
fair market value (Munch 1976; Chang 2010), which can reduce ex ante incentives to invest.
Perceived under-compensation along with the fact that racial minorities have their property
disproportionately taken (Carpenter and Ross 2009; Frieden and Sagalyn 1991) has raised
concerns that revenue-seeking governments collude with private developers (Byrne 2005)
at the expense of disadvantaged groups. This view is echoed by liberal and conservative
Kelo dissenters arguing that taking land from the poor on behalf of a large pharmaceutical
company (Pfizer) amounted to “Reverse Robin Hood.”
More recently, courts have broadened the rights of individuals to challenge government
regulations as a taking. When these regulations deprive the property owner of all reasonable
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use or value of the property, they are deemed a regulatory taking. Examples of alleged
regulatory takings include zoning restrictions for the location of hotels (Dexter 345 Inc. v.
Cuomo, 2011) and regulations shortening the fishing year (Vandevere v. Lloyd, 2011).
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922) established the doctrine of regulatory takings.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) held that an owner does not waive his right to challenge a
regulation as a taking because he purchased the property after the regulation was enacted.
As a consequence, many environmental regulations and zoning laws that potentially limit
how property owners can use their land are litigated as regulatory takings.
Recently the boundary between physical and regulatory takings has blurred. For exam-
ple, the local government can build a beach protection, which could constitute a physical
taking, or require landowners to build a beach protection, which would constitute a regu-
lation. Litigation has further blurred the test for what constitutes a physical or regulatory
takings: from a “diminution-of-value” test (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922) held
that whether a regulation constitutes a taking that requires compensation depends on the
extent of the diminution of the value of the property) to an “economic impact” / “interference
with investment-backed expectations” test (Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City (1978) held landmark status does not constitute a regulatory taking because it did not
prevent the owner from continuing to benefit from the property) to a “permanent physical
presence” test (Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982) held that a regula-
tion that is a permanent physical occupation of property is a regulatory taking to the extent
of the occupation, regardless of whether there is a public benefit or if the interference to the
owner is only minimal) to a “total takings” test (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
(1992) held that a regulation that deprives the owner of all economically beneficial uses of
land is a taking unless the use interest was never part of the title to begin with) for whether
a regulation constitutes a taking that requires compensation.
Legal precedent develops through analogies. For example, Roe v. Wade extended the
right of privacy under the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which was previously
interpreted as precluding government interference in freedom of contract4; Roe v. Wade in-
terpreted Due Process as precluding government interference in a woman’s decision to have
an abortion. This example means that legal precedent develops through analogies at the con-
ceptual level—the impact of cases includes the conceptual innovation, and are not restricted
to future instances of identical fact patterns.
2.2 ModelGoldstein v. Pataki, a case in our data, illustrates important economic mech-
anisms and identification concerns. Here, the Second Circuit Court set a precedent allowing
New York to take land for a private developer intending to build a basketball arena that
would attract the New Jersey Nets, against the wishes of politicians in New Jersey, in the
Third Circuit. The project halted in 2006 when litigation began and the Circuit Court de-
4See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897).
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cision occurred in 2008. The last homeowner evicted was compensated $3 million in 2010
and the sports arena was completed in 2012, with thousands of apartment units promised
by 2025. Fifty years earlier, an attempt to condemn property for a baseball stadium at the
same site failed because, at that time, a privately financed baseball park was not deemed ap-
propriate public use; the baseball team later relocated and became the Los Angeles Dodgers.
In 2008, racial minorities and small business owners protested the definition of “public” in
the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Takings Clause, but community groups (including
some minorities) supporting the project were paid at least $0.5 million by the developer.
The project was adjacent to an increasingly desirable neighborhood in New York City. We
know the decision created precedent in both the federal and state courts, since the case was
cited as precedent by the New York Supreme Court (a state court) within two years and by
the District Court in the Second Circuit in 2012, in both cases allowing a physical takings
to benefit private parties.
We present a model of physical and regulatory takings that embeds prominent theories
of eminent domain. The model obtains the standard result in law and economics models
that any compensation that increases with investment is inefficient (e.g., Blume, Rubinfeld
and Shapiro 1984; Kaplow 1986; Innes 1997): Socially optimal investment should take into
account the fact that the invested capital is lost when the land is taken. In a second view,
takings risk, however, leads to underinvestment, unless there is just compensation (e.g.,
Besley 1995; Banerjee et al. 2002; Hornbeck 2010). In the third view, takings can lead
to growth when public use benefits of government activity are taken into account (Barro
1990). We show that part of the reason for conflicting views on eminent domain is that the
benchmark for what is socially optimal varies across prior models.
2.3 Investment by Property OwnersThe risk-neutral property owner invests I in her
property and expects V (I) return from investment. Government compensation C = C(I) is
a function of investment. The law requires the government to pay the property owner, taking
into account a number of factors including book value (the appraisal price of the property).
Factors include market demand; proximity to areas already developed in a compatible manner
with the intended use; economic development in the area; specific plans of businesses and
individuals; actions already taken to develop land for that use; scarcity of land for that use;
negotiations with buyers; absence of offers to buy property; and the use of the property at
the time of the taking (60 Am. Jur. Trials 447). The last factor, in particular, is likely to
increase with property owner investment.
We assume that compensation increases with investment, but at a decreasing rate: C(0) =
0, CI(I) > 0, and CII(I) < 0. Let pi be the probability that the court allows a taking to
occur.
First best optimal investment occurs when marginal benefits equal marginal costs. Follow-
ing the convention in the literature, “first best” refers to optimal investment when there is no
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government intervention and “second best” refers to optimal investment taking government
intervention as given. Moreover, government benefit and costs of takings are omitted when
there is no government intervention.
(1) max
I
V (I)− I i.e., V ′(I) = 1
Second best optimal investment is achieved at:
(2) max
I
(1− pi)V (I)− I
i.e.,
(3) V ′(I) =
1
(1− pi) > 1
Since compensation is just a transfer, it does not enter the optimand. With diminishing
returns, V ′′(I) < 0, the second best investment level is below the first best investment level.
A taking deprives all value from the original investment, making property owners less willing
to invest, but total loss of V (I) from a taking is not necessary for the result.
The property owner, however, takes compensation into account and maximizes the ex-
pected return, ER:
(4) max
I
ER = max
I
{(1− pi)V (I) + piC(I)}
The property owner’s optimal investment is achieved when:
(5) (1− pi)V ′(I) + piCI(I) = 1
so that
(6) V ′(I) =
1− piCI(I)
1− pi <
1
1− pi
Equation 6 indicates that the property owner always overinvests compared to the sec-
ond best optimal investment. The only way to eliminate overinvestment is to set CI(I) =
0 = C(I), which is contrary to the doctrine of “just compensation.” However, this assumes
the non-zero probability of takings is fixed and uses the second best as benchmark. With
exogenous variation in takings risk in our empirical framework, we use the first best as a
12
benchmark. From the equations above, we can see that, compared to the first best, “just
compensation,” C(I) = V (I), results in optimal investment.
2.4 Government Action: Physical TakingsLocal governments are constrained to fol-
low court precedent. The property owner perceives the probability λ of government takings,
which is allowed by the court with probability pi. Then, the property owner’s expected return
is:
(7) max
I
ER = max
I
{(1− λ)(V (I)− I) + λ[(1− pi)V (I) + piC(I)]}
With the additional uncertainty of government takings, the property owner’s optimal invest-
ment is achieved at:
(8) V ′(I)− 1− λpiV ′(I) + λpiCI(I) = 0 so that V ′(I) = 1− λpiCI(I)
1− λpi
Taking the total derivative of Equation 8 yields the following expression:
(9) dI =
V ′(I)− CI(I)
(1− λpi)V ′′(I) + λpiCII(I)(pidλ+ λdpi)
With “just compensation,” CI(I) = 1, it follows that
dI
dpi
= 0.
Both over- and underinvestment relative to first best can occur depending on whether
CI(I) is, respectively, bigger or smaller than 1. For example, if CI(I) < 1 < V ′(I), then
dI
dpi
and
dI
dpip
< 0 because V ′′(I) < 0 and CII(I) < 0. Decisions making it easier for the
government to appropriate, which increase actual and perceived probability of government
takings and the probability that subsequent courts will rule in favor of the government, lead
to underinvestment only if there is under-compensation. Overinvestment relative to first best
occurs only if there is over-compensation, i.e., CI(I) > 1.
2.5 Government Action: Regulatory TakingsWith regulatory takings cases, there is
no compensation when the court rules in favor of the government. We assume L is the loss of
investment value. If plaintiffs win, they receive compensation (courts are reluctant to simply
reverse a regulation—invalidation of a regulatory ordinance without payment of fair value
for the use of the property during the period of the taking is considered a constitutionally
insufficient remedy. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)). The compensation should be equivalent to their loss in
investment value.
If governments choose between litigating or regulating (Shleifer 2010) (since to initiate
a physical condemnation, the government must bring a case to court), then the investor’s
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decision becomes:
(10) max
I
(1− pip − pir)V (I) + pir(V (I)− L)− I
where pip and pir are the probabilities that the court allows a physical or regulatory tak-
ing, respectively. If L is a function of investment, then investment also declines with the
probability of regulations.
2.6 Public UseAs we are guided by the only set of theoretical models in the scientific
literature that we are aware of, and these models did not model the direct impact of eminent
domain decisions, we extend the model as follows. If public services are a complementary
input to private production, and production returns to private capital are more sharply
diminishing without public services, then government expenditures increase growth (Barro
1990). Let y = Φ(k, g) = kφ( g
k
) in a constant returns to scale model, where y is output,
k is private capital, and g is public services. An optimal non-zero level of takings can be
derived: δγ
δ( g
y
)
= 1
σ
φ( g
k
)(φ′ − 1), where γ is growth. Growth rate increases government power
of expropriation if the public infrastructure is small enough such that φ′ > 1 and declines if
public infrastructure is large enough such that φ′ < 1. It also reflects the degree of Coasean
bargaining among numerous property rights owners and compensation policy.
Barro (1990) makes no mention of eminent domain, but observes that enhanced property
rights look like reductions in marginal tax rates. This claim implicitly assumes C(I) < V (I).
If eminent domain reduces property rights and increases public infrastructure, then govern-
ment power of expropriation has ambiguous effects. Inequality increases if those targeted by
eminent domain are systematically different from those benefiting from public use projects
or if benefits of public projects are unevenly distributed.
2.7 DiscussionTo summarize, unless public use benefits counteract investment distor-
tions, court decisions that expand government power of expropriation should have no effect
on growth or investment when there is just compensation. Government takings and displace-
ment increase if local governments were previously constrained, but GDP, property prices,
labor market and housing outcomes, and investment are all invariant to court decisions if
C(I) = V (I).
Many studies of eminent domain report under-compensation (Munch 1976; Chang 2010;
Fennell 2004; Radin 1982). If C(I) < V (I), then insecure property rights lead to underinvest-
ment, lower property prices, and adverse labor market and housing outcomes (Besley 1995;
Field 2005; Hornbeck 2010). Moreover, a precedent making it easier to take may decrease
compensation by changing the relative bargaining power of future litigants, further reducing
economic growth. Unequal access to courts can theoretically lead to asymmetric bargaining
over “just compensation” in the shadow of the law (Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979; Steven-
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son and Wolfers 2006) and empirically lead to different court judgments (Chen et al. 2013;
2015; 2014c; 2016d).
The model is intended to clarify that growth occurs only if the public use benefits are
substantial, regardless of whether there is over- or under-compensation. Second, inequality
arises with under-compensation. It shows that the oft-stated assertion that any compen-
sation leads to over-investment is not generically true, not without additional behavioral
assumptions such as one where property owners over-develop to deter government actors
from taking their property instead of someone else’s property. The unified framework links
government power of expropriation to investment, actual and perceived takings risk, dis-
placement, compensation, inequality, and growth—outcomes that we examine.
2.8 Testing the Empirical PredictionsThe most robust prediction of the model is
that outcomes are likely to differ in Circuit-years that issue pro-government Takings ju-
risprudence. To test this, we will simply compare the outcomes in Circuit-years with pro-
government and pro-property owner Takings jurisprudence and perform robustness checks
to confirm that the difference seems to be due to Takings jurisprudence.
To link legal precedent with economic growth, we parameterize φ( g
k
) = eρLawctAct. Consider
a general dynamic growth equation for log-level of per-capita output:
(11) yct = Act + α1yct−1 + ...+ αnyct−n + ρ0Lawct + ρ1Lawct−1 + ...+ ρnLawct−n + εct
allowing output to depend on n lags of past output and adding an error term.
We assume that Act evolves according to:
(12) ΔAct = gc + γ0Lawct + ...+ γnLawct−n
This allows both current and lagged jurisprudence to affect the growth rate of A.
Substituting ΔAct into a first differenced version of yct yields a dynamic panel estimation
equation of the following form. Dell et al. (2012) show in Monte Carlo simulations that first-
differencing is very effective at correctly identifying both level effects and growth effects and
that first-differencing avoids relying on cointegration assumptions for identification.
(13) Δyct = gc + α1Δyct−1 + ...+ αnΔyct−n + γ0Lawct + ...+ γnLawct−n+
ρ0ΔLawct + ρ1ΔLawct−1 + ...+ ρnΔLawct−n +Δεct
The “level effects” of law on output appear through ρ. The “growth effects” of law appear
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through γ. Rewriting the ΔLaw terms as Law terms yields:
(14)
Δyct = gc + α1Δyct−1 + ...+ αnΔyct−n + (γ0 + ρ0)Lawct + (γ1 + ρ1 − ρ0)Lawct−1 + ...
+(γn + ρn − ρn−1)Lawct−n − ρnLawct−n−1 +Δεct
Relabeling the coefficients on Law yields:
(15) Δyct = gc + α1Δyct−1 + ...+ αnΔyct−n +
n+1∑
j=0
βjLawcj +Δεct
To find the growth effect, consider Δyct−j = Δy and Lawcj = Law. Solving yields:
(16) Δyc =
gc
1− α1 − ...− αn +
∑n+1
j=0 βj
1− α1 − ...− αnLawc
so that the growth effect of jurisprudence is simply
∑n+1
j=0 βj
1−α1−...−αn , which is identical to
∑n
j=0 γj
1−α1−...−αn
since the ρ terms all cancel.
As we find variation in Law that is randomly assigned, we focus on αj = 0 for all j and
estimate:
(17) gct = θc + θt +
L∑
n=0
βt−nLawct−n +Δεct
where θc are Circuit fixed effects, θt are time fixed effects, and Lawct is a vector of annual
jurisprudence with up to L lags included. This equation captures the growth effect of law,
e.g., the effect of law on features, such as institutions that influence productivity growth.
The growth equation allows separate identification of level effects and growth effects
through the examination of βj. In particular, both effects influence the growth rate in the
initial period. The difference is that the level effect eventually reverses itself. For example,
a jurisprudential shock may affect government spending, but after a few periods, spending
returns to normal. By contrast, the growth effect appears during the jurisprudential shock
and is not reversed. A failure to innovate in one period leaves the Circuit permanently further
behind. The growth effect is identified as the summation of the jurisprudential effects over
time. Following the convention in the growth literature, we are interested in the distributed
lag effect and test for joint significance of the lags.
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Another way to think about our research design is that laws are not likely to have an
immediate impact. Laws might not be instantaneously capitalized in prices (DellaVigna and
Pollet 2007). Expectations or statutory regimes may take time to adjust. In sum, the simple
model of takings embeds competing views of eminent domain. Our model suggests that
making it easier for the government to reassign property rights, even with compensation,
typically leads to lower economic growth because of distortion in investment incentives,
unless there is failure of Coasean bargaining among numerous property owners. If there are
no public use benefits and there is fair market compensation, a greater risk of takings has
no effect on economic outcomes. Introducing under-compensation, a greater risk of takings
leads to under-investment and lower property prices, and these investment distortions would
invariably lead to lower economic growth. Positive growth effects would be due to the benefits
of public projects that redress failure of Coasean bargaining. Positive effects on property
prices could be due to the capitalization of public projects or to over-investment.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 U.S. Courts of AppealsA foundational understanding of the U.S. federal courts
is important to understanding our identification strategy, which relies on the law-making
function of common law courts. This making of law occurs because a judge’s decisions in
current cases become precedent for use in future cases in the same court and in lower courts
of the same jurisdiction. There are three layers of federal courts: District, Circuit, and the
U.S. Supreme Court. The 94 U.S. District Courts serve as the general trial courts, where a
jury is drawn to decide issues of facts. If a party appeals the decision, the case goes up to
a Circuit Court, which decides issues of law ; they take facts as given from District Courts
and have no juries. The 12 U.S. Circuit Courts, also known as federal appellate courts, are
only to hear cases presenting new legal issues (only 10-20% of District Court opinions are
appealed). Cases that reach the Courts of Appeals are the more challenging and controversial
cases with the greatest likelihood to set new precedent. Figure 1 displays District Court
boundaries in dotted lines and Circuit Court boundaries—encompassing between 5 and 13
Districts each—in solid lines. The Federal Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction based on
geography and handles mostly patent cases, so is omitted.
In deciding issues of law, Courts of Appeals provide new interpretations or distinctions
of pre-existing precedents or statutes. These new distinctions expand or contract the space
under which an actor is found liable (Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007). For example, in Martino
v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141, the Ninth Circuit held that a taking
had occurred, when the local government issued an ordinance requiring that the property
owner obtain permits and establish dedications for a flood control project before the property
owner could develop his property. InMoore v. Costa Mesa, 886 F. 2d 260, which distinguished
Martino, the Ninth Circuit subsequently held that a conditional variance that affects only a
small portion of the property owner’s property is not a taking.
17
Each Circuit Court decides many thousands of cases per year (less than 1 case per Circuit
per year is related to eminent domain), but only 2% of Circuit cases successfully appeal to
the U.S. Supreme Court, so Courts of Appeals determine the vast majority of decisions each
year that set legal precedent. Circuit Court decisions are binding precedent, but only within
that Circuit. When Circuits choose to adopt the precedent of another Circuit, it is typically
with some delay: before an opinion can be issued in the new Circuit, a case bringing the same
issue of law must be filed in a District Court, appealed to the Circuit Court, and decided
upon. Circuit Court decisions are persuasive precedent on state courts within the Circuit.
Persuasive precedent must be adopted by the state courts to become binding precedent.
Each case in the Courts of Appeals receives three randomly assigned judges out of a pool
of judges, numbering roughly 8 to 40 depending on the size of the Circuit. These judges
are appointed for life by the U.S. President and their positions and decisions are highly es-
teemed. Except for retirement, Courts of Appeals judges typically leave the bench only for a
position in the U.S. Supreme Court. State officials are instructed to establish and annually
update a set of guidelines based on federal and state law to assist state agencies in identi-
fying and analyzing actions that may result in a taking; they have reported adjusting their
acquisitions and land-use regulations to avoid exposure to costly litigation after Courts of
Appeals decisions (Frost and Lindquist 2010; U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal
Highway Administration 2005; Pollak 2001). Even in matters of an easement for a bicycle
path, government actors refrained from the exactment because of their attention to regula-
tory takings precedent in the Courts of Appeals (Pollak 2001). Newspapers, advocates, and
community organizers highlight change in the legal landscape after Courts of Appeals deci-
sions (Pastor 2007; Eagle 2007; Sandefur 2005) and property owners perceive greater takings
risk after major eminent domain decisions (Nadler and Diamond 2008; Nadler et al. 2008).
Since judges follow precedent (Chen et al. 2014a) and markets respond to Courts of Appeals
decisions (Araiza et al. 2014), we may expect to see an effect of Circuit Court decisions on
property buyers, sellers, and government actors.
The courts are polarized by group identity, personal experience, and legal philosophy. A
large literature documents the causal effects of biographical characteristics, experience, and
legal philosophy on judicial decisions. For example, law and economics thought causes con-
servative jurisprudence, Courts of Appeals judges behave more partisan before Presidential
elections, wins and losses of sports games affect judicial decisions, ideological perfectionism
affects decisions, decisions on recent cases affect the next decision, and explanatory power
of extraneous factors persist after employing the best prediction models of judges’ decisions
(Ash et al. 2016; Barry et al. 2016; Berdejó and Chen 2014; Chen 2016; Chen and Eagel
2016; Chen et al. 2015a; 2014; 2015b; 2016c; 2016b).
In our setting, racial minority Democrats have worked for the NAACP, a civil rights
organization that advocates for racial minorities and backed the Private Property Rights
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Protection Act (if the Act passes, a state or political subdivision that exercises eminent
domain for economic development would be cut off from receiving federal economic grants
for two years). Republican federal prosecutors have prior experience advocating on behalf
of business and government interests. The assignment of these judges results in different
outcomes. In some Circuits, judges are randomly assigned when cases arise, while in other
Circuits, judges are randomly assigned to panels up to a year in advance and cases are
randomly assigned to panels. Some judges take a reduced caseload if retired or visiting, but all
are randomly assigned by a computer algorithm. From discussions with government officials
at the Courts of Appeals, it appears that randomization occurs. More importantly, in Chen
and Sethi (2011), they formally test for randomization by showing that case characteristics
as determined by District Courts are not correlated with the characteristics of the Circuit
judges assigned to the case.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Legal Cases We follow and use the regulatory takings database collected by Sun-
stein et al. (2006). We employ an identical methodology to create a physical takings database
of 180 physical takings precedents from 1950-2008. First, we select major Supreme Court
precedent: Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229 (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Kelo
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
We include Loretto v. Teleprompter because it involves a physical presence of government
and may have subsequently guided government officials as to what constitutes a physical
taking. Second, we select all Courts of Appeals cases citing these cases. Third, we restrict
to three-judge cases that discussed whether the government had physically invaded, was
present on the property, or had taken the property. These cases focus on the meaning of
“public use” and what constitutes a taking (damages would be determined by finders of fact
in District Courts whereas Circuit Courts focus on matters of law). Fourth, we remove cases
that overlap the regulatory takings database. For 1976-2008, 33 cases are removed, resulting
in 134 cases in the analysis frame. Finally, we coded the Circuit decisions to the zip codes
where the alleged taking took place.
Figure 2 shows a map for the location of original Courts of Appeals takings controversies
in our database. The Eleventh Circuit was created in 1981 by splitting it off from the Fifth
Circuit; Fifth Circuit decisions before this split are considered binding precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit. We account for this in our analyses. A wide range of economic policies are
affected by Takings Clause jurisprudence. Policies affected by physical takings jurisprudence
include dams, sewers, beach protection, and river-diversion. Regulations are also affected
because physical takings precedent influences regulatory takings precedent even if the 33
regulatory takings cases are excluded. The cases in our physical takings database include
litigation around a government-built dam that flooded land, sewer construction that deprived
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property owners of well water, beach protection, and government diversion of a river. A vote
is coded as pro-property owner if the judge voted to grant any relief to the party alleging
a violation of the Takings Clause. Appendix Table 1 provides the list and coding of cases.
Figure 3 plots the quantity of eminent domain cases that were decided pro-property owner or
pro-government over time and Table 1 displays summary statistics. There are 0.33 physical
takings Circuit cases per Circuit-year; 27% of Circuit-years had physical takings cases.
We restrict our cases to physical takings precedent, but because of the blurring of the
boundaries between physical and regulatory takings (both in terms of the government actions
and the threshold tests), physical takings precedent may subsequently be cited by regulatory
takings cases or by local government actors when issuing regulations. Thus, our data may
be overinclusive. As placebo check, we utilize the collation by Sunstein et al. (2006) of 220
regulatory takings precedents in Courts of Appeals from 1979-2004. The cases were identified
by tracking the citations of the following landmark Supreme Court decisions: Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
483 U.S. 825 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987);
and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The data
includes a range of regulatory takings decisions regarding zoning restrictions on hotels and
gambling, noise regulations requiring enclosure of car racing facilities, and environmental
regulations shortening the fishing year. Regulations should not be expected to have the
same effects as physical takings on highway construction and racial inequality.
We collected District Court cases, state court cases, and state treatises that cited our
Circuit Court cases. We also collected District Court cases that cite the same Supreme Court
precedents as our Circuit cases, administrative data on these cases from the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts (AOC), and PACER filings on District Court cases. Sixteen years of
Public Access to Court Electronic Records are available on open source sites for 33 Districts.
We used PACER data to obtain judge identities that are missing in the AOC data. The
latter two datasets, together, assess whether judicial biographies affect the publication of
District cases.
3.2.2 Judicial Biographies We compiled information on judges’ characteristics from the
Appeals Court Attribute Data, District Court Attribute Data,5 Federal Judicial Center, and
our own data collection. The final dataset includes information on vital statistics. Variables
include: geographic history, education, occupational history, governmental positions, military
service, religion, race, gender, and political affiliations. Raw data on religion come from
Goldman (1999).6 Judges whose religions remained missing or unknown were coded as having
no publicly known religious affiliation. As social issues divide starkly along religious lines in
the U.S., it is reasonable to hypothesize that judges with different religious to may come to
5http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/attributes.html
6Additional religion data are available at http://courseweb.stthomas.edu/gcsisk/religion.study.data/cover.htm.
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different conclusions in certain cases (Chen and Lind 2007, 2014). We filled in missing data
by searching transcripts of Congressional confirmation hearings and other official or news
publications on Lexis.
In our data analysis, the average Circuit-year includes 17.66 judges who are available for as-
signment to panels. Judges occasionally visit from District Courts or specialized courts. In ro-
bustness checks, we omit visiting judges. The expected number of racial minority Democrats
per seat is 0.06, and the expected number of Republican former federal prosecutors per seat
is 0.04 (Table 1). We calculate the expectations based on the composition of the Circuit
pool of judges available to be assigned in any Circuit-year assuming that all judges have an
equal probability of assignment. Expected number of judges per seat is a proportion varying
from 0 to 1. Senior judges sit less frequently and we weigh their characteristics accordingly
in calculating expectations. In robustness checks, we omit senior judges and use the exact
months in which judges are appointed or retire to calculate their availability.
3.2.3 Economic Outcomes We constructed a panel of roughly 40,000 zip codes followed
quarterly from 1975 to 2008 by using Fiserv Case-Shiller Weiss house-price indices at the zip
code level. We merge this data at the annual level. When zip code-specific price indices were
unavailable, we substituted the price index for the next geographic level (e.g., county, then
division, CBSA, or state). This imputation is standard in the literature. It should not affect
our results since we cluster our standard errors at a higher level. The indices are based on
repeat sales data on single-family homes.
A limitation of Fiserv is that the type of land being sold may change in response to takings
law, so we also collected repeat mortgage transactions handled by Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac, from the Federal Housing Finance Agency. We also used house-price indices in the 20
metropolitan areas provided by S&P Case-Shiller. An earlier draft presented replications of
our findings in both datasets. We calculated zip code-specific population estimates for 2005
from the U.S. Census. As standard in the literature, we weight our analyses by population,
which alleviates the concern that Fiserv may include non-residential zip codes.7
We obtain state-level yearly GDP from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We aggregate
across all industries by year.8 The average local GDP growth of 5% is very close to the
annualized average quarterly change in log price index of 1.2% in our data. Sectoral GDP is
obtained from the same source. Since industry categorization changes in 1998, we omit 1998
when examining first-differences.
We obtain residential displacement, housing, and labor market outcomes from the Current
Population Survey (CPS). We weight our analysis with CPS-provided weights.
3.2.4 Government Actions As far as we are aware, only one dataset uniformly measures
the exercise of eminent domain across jurisdictions. The Uniform Relocation Assistance and
7The Census data documentation is located at: http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf1.pdf.
8http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/default.cfm#download.
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Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (“Uniform Act”) and its regulations require
states to report statistics related to in-state real property acquisitions by governments for
all highway and transportation projects receiving federal aid.
To acquire property, local governments must offer just compensation to the owners and
give the owners reasonable time to consider offers. Condemnation proceedings occur only
after the parties are unable to reach an agreement through negotiations required by the
statute. Around 80% of the property acquisitions are settled before the government pursues
a condemnation proceeding, but our data include settlement. In a property acquisition,
displaced residents are also eligible to receive reimbursements for relocation expenses and
the added costs of obtaining replacement housing, and displaced businesses are eligible for
moving and reestablishment expenses, up to specific ceilings.
We collected annual state-level real property acquisitions, condemnations, compensa-
tion, and displacement expenses for 1991-2009 from the Federal Highway Administration.9
Specifically, we collected: aggregate compensation for all parcels acquired per state-year
whether through open market purchase, condemnation, or administrative settlement, aggre-
gate parcels acquired per state-year, and displacement and relocation costs.
We correlate these statistics with sectoral GDP and find that all sectors, except for the
service sector, are positively correlated with condemnations. Notably, we also find that pro-
government physical takings precedent has a negative impact on the service sector.
We also collected data on miles of highway construction from 1950 to 2008. The data is
obtained from the Form PR-511 Database and Federal Highway Administration publications.
We collected 2-digit highways (rays away from MSAs that connect central business districts
with regions outside the central city), 3-digit highways (circles around MSAs that primarily
serve urban areas), 2-digit federal highways (interstate between MSAs), and planned high-
ways. This data was used in a prior study that found that highway construction caused
economic growth (Baum-Snow 2007).
We do not imply that eminent domain only affects highway construction–the wide range
of economic policies affected by our physical takings database includes dams, sewer con-
struction, beach protection, and river-diversion–and the modern administrative state entails
regulatory schemes that routinely reassign property rights. Rather, we used these data be-
cause it is collected in a uniform, mandatory manner across jurisdictions, and we have reason
to believe the government actions being measured would impact economic growth and racial
inequality (Semuels 2016).
3.3 State Response to Courts of Appeals PrecedentThe vast majority of takings
are initiated by state and local officials and litigated in state courts. So, before proceeding,
we present evidence that our takings precedents are followed by states within the Circuit
but not outside. We find that state governments enact statutory amendments to comply
9http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/realestate/rowstats/index.cfm.
22
with Circuit Court decisions, and state courts write decisions in response to Circuit Court
precedent.
First, citation counts indicate that our physical takings cases are cited by state statutes
and treatises ten times as frequently within the Circuit than outside the Circuit (the average
number of citations per state by state statutes and treatises is 0.55 inside the Circuit and
0.05 citations outside the Circuit). For regulatory takings, inside the Circuit, they receive
0.7 citations by state statutes and 1.1 citations by treatises, but outside the Circuit, 0.03
citations by state statutes and 0.3 citations by treatises.
Second, we read each case involving state or local government officials.10 The reason for the
citation reveals that state citations to cases where the state lost are statutory amendments
complying with the Circuit Court precedent. In one exception, the purpose of the citation
was to distinguish from the Courts of Appeals decision 15 years later, which suggests that
the decision was presumed to be precedent in the meantime.
We also examined the subsequent state reaction to 15 Courts of Appeals judgments where
the state lost the case (“pro-property owner” cases). These 15 cases, which come from the 48
pro-property owner Courts of Appeals decisions in the sample of 220 total regulatory takings
cases, were subsequently cited in state annotated statutes inside the relevant Circuit. In 3
of the 15 cases, the state clearly reacted to the Circuit Court judgment. In the remainder,
the case was included in a list of citations that reflected an annual update of relevant federal
and state law.
For example, Kruse v. Village of Chagrin Falls, 74 F.3d 694 (6th Cir. 1996) (OH):
Landowner’s takings claim ripe for review under federal law because there were no other
reasonable remedies available to them under Ohio’s appropriation statutes after a taking oc-
curred without notice or compensation; no statutory framework existed for inverse condem-
nation claim. And writ of mandamus, at best a wholly equitable and post-injury procedure,
was inadequate (Ohio Rev. Code §§ 163.01-163.62).
State reaction: In State ex rel. Hensley v. City of Columbus, 2011 Ohio 3311 (Ohio Ct.
App., Franklin County, 2011) the Ohio Court of Appeals implicitly highlighted the fact that
for 15 years the presumption was the Circuit Court law was in force. It indicated that,
contrary to 6th Circuit’s decision in Kruse, mandamus is the appropriate means to compel
proceedings to compensate for a taking of private property, pursuant to a 1994 decision of
the Ohio Supreme Court (State ex rel. Levin v. Sheffield Lake, 1994 Ohio 385).
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24 (1st. Cir. 2002) (MA): Invalidated state disclosure
law requiring publication of lists of cigarette additives, since lists were trade secrets protected
by takings clause. (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94, § 307B).
State reaction: Currently pending legislation would reinstate statute with a section indi-
10We do not include cases where the federal government is litigant as those cases would go to the Federal
Circuit.
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cating that a tobacco company’s cigarette additive list would be protected as a trade secret
to the extent provided under federal law. (Mass SB 1120, apparently about to be passed;
referred to senate ethics and rules committee Sept. 24, 2012.)
Dakota, Minn. & R.R. Corp. v. S.D., 362 F.3d 512, (8th Cir. 2004) (SD): Invalidated
portions of statute delegating state’s eminent domain power to railroads, since it granted
utilities easements in the railroads’ rights-of-way without charge, which constituted a taking
of railroad property without just compensation. (S.D. Codified Laws § 49-16A-75.3(5)).
State reaction: In Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. v. Rounds, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (D.S.D.
2006), the District Court noted pending amendments to the offending statute, which would
require a reasonable fee for the easements, would render the case moot; amendments came
into effect in June 2006, three months after the District Court decision.
In sum, these quantitative and qualitative citations suggest that we can feel reasonably
confident that state courts are predominantly following the precedent of Circuit Courts that
contain them.
Moreover, federal courts are also following precedent from the Circuit containing them,
but not cases from outside: citations by subsequent Circuit and District cases inside the
Circuit are an order of magnitude larger than citations outside the Circuit.11 Reading these
District cases also indicate that District Court cases are following Circuit precedent.
Judicial compliance in District Courts to Courts of Appeals decisions is verified in other
quantitative work: A key challenge to examining whether law has precedent using only the
data on cases in the courts is to address the endogenous selection of cases into courts based on
legal standard. Chen et al. (2014a) examines cases filed before the Courts of Appeals decision
but resolved after the decision. Such a methodology requires relatively high frequency judicial
decision-making (e.g., on piercing corporate veil cases) for all relevant cases filed in District
Courts, along with random assignment of judges setting precedent.
3.4 Empirical StrategyThe econometric challenge behind knowing whether common
laws have impacts is at least three-fold. First, legal precedent develops through extensive
cross-fertilization of legal doctrine between different areas of law via elaborate analogies. The
earlier example from abortion jurisprudence highlighted how Roe v. Wade was analogized
from freedom of contract.12 With cross-fertilization, real outcomes may be misattributed to
one legal rule when many legal rules are changing simultaneously. The conventional approach
would be to control for other legal rules, but it is practically infeasible to code–much less
select–all the possible related doctrinal areas. This example also means that legal prece-
dent develops through analogies at the conceptual level—the impact of cases includes the
conceptual innovation, and are not restricted to future instances of identical fact patterns.
Second, Besley and Case (2000) cautioned against causal interpretation of correlations
11The average case receives 7 citations.
12See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897).
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between real outcomes and laws because constituents can influence policies. This concern
is a particularly trenchant for court cases (Klarman 2005), because the legal doctrine often
instructs judges to take account the community standards, i.e., norms (Chen and Yeh 2013),
which feeds into the definition of public use, so it will be difficult to distinguish between laws
causing real outcomes from real outcomes causing laws. Courts may also incorporate future
trends in decision-making: if property prices are expected to increase, then courts may be
less likely to rule that a taking meets the criteria for public use such as blight removal, which
would lead to a downward bias in OLS estimates. Or it may be more likely to rule a taking
meets the criteria for public use because of anticipated complementarities (e.g., the Goldstein
v. Pataki example of building a sport stadium near a booming development), which would
lead to an upwards bias in OLS estimates.
Third, judges are consequentialist (Chen and Schonger 2013, 2015): They take into ac-
count the potential consequences of their decisions–at least some judges on both the left
(Breyer 2006) and right (Posner 1998) do. Judge Richard Posner has lamented that, “[judi-
cial] opinions lack the empirical support that is crucial to sound constitutional adjudication”
(Posner 1998); similarly Justice Breyer remarked, “I believe that a[n] interpretive approach
that undervalues consequences, by undervaluing related constitutional objectives, exacts a
constitutional price that is too high” (Breyer 2006). Consequentialism (in our case, maximiz-
ing economic growth or efficiency or minimizing racial inequality or unfairness) can bias the
correlation between future outcomes and today’s decisions if they desire similar consequences
while sitting on other cases.
We overcome these three challenges with random variation in legal precedent using bio-
graphical characteristics of judges: We would not want judges to randomize their decisions
in the interest of legal science, but the judges themselves are randomly assigned and their
background correlates with the way they decide, effectively creating a clinical trial that
randomizes pro-government vs. pro-property owner jurisprudence. Policy-makers and schol-
ars have sought to evaluate legal institutions and sought estimates of the causal effects of
common law decisions (Posner 1998; Breyer 2006); see also, World Bank Law and Justice
Institutions Performance Evaluation and calls for randomizing law (Abramowicz et al. 2011).
Because of the randomization built into the U.S. Federal Courts, the basic empirical strat-
egy is straightforward. The effect of Takings Clause jurisprudence is obtained by comparing
the means of the outcomes of interest after pro-government precedent and pro-property
owner precedent. Note that this difference is not an estimate of the comparison between
pro-government precedent and no precedent. The government and economic activities can
be different than what they would have been if there was no precedent whatsoever. We are
mostly interested in the effect of pro-government precedent, rather than pro-property owner
precedent, when there is a precedent, as this would be the effect of the decision of a judge
deliberating on the case.
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Denoting Y ict as the value of the outcome of interest for individual (state, zip code, or
person) i (say, GDP) and Lawct as a dummy equal to 1 if the decision was pro-government,
this estimate is simply:
(1) E[Y ict|Lawct = 1]− E[Y ict|Lawct = 0] ≡ β1.
We expect β1 > 0 if failure of Coasean bargaining makes φ′ > 1. Since we are interested
in effects over time, we specify a distributed lag. We extend our specification to include the
presence of a decision, 1 [Mct−n > 0]. We focus on four years of lags and one lead (n = −1
to 4) and vary the lag structure for robustness. M is the number of cases, which is typically
0 or 1 (so typically Lawc(t−n) is 1 (100% pro-government) or 0 (100% pro-property owner)).
Since most of our data is yearly, we take the average law measurements in each Circuit-year,
which also preserves the structure of our randomization (the moment condition for causal
inference is the easiest to interpret, but previous drafts considered, estimated, and validated
robustness to alternative specifications). We also considered weighting our estimates by the
number of cases in a Circuit-year, where weights are the geometric mean of Mc(t−n) + 1 over
the distributed lag. The statistical significance of the results increases, so we present more
conservative estimates without weighting.
(2) gct = θc + θt +
L∑
n=0
β1t−nLawct−n +
L∑
n=0
β2t−n1 [Mct−n > 0] + εct
Analogizing to coin flips, β1 captures the effect of the heads-or-tails coin flip (pro-government
vs. pro-property owner precedent), β1 + β2 captures the effect of the heads coin flip and the
presence of the coin (pro-government precedent vs. no decision), and β2 captures the effect of
the tails coin flip and the presence of the coin (pro-property owner precedent vs. no decision).
We examine several outcomes: change in log yearly state GDP, change in log quarterly
zip code property prices, change in log miles of federal highways, condemnation statistics,
whether an individual moved in the last year, and employment status. We will test whether
there are differences in outcomes of racial minorities by running the regression:
(3) Yict = θc + θt +
∑L
n=0 β3t−nLawct−n +
∑L
n=0 β4t−n1 [Mct−n > 0] +∑L
n=0 β5t−nLawct−n ∗Bict +
∑L
n=0 β6t−n1 [Mct−n > 0] ∗Bict + ηXict + εict
Bict represents a dummy indicator for being non-white. We expect β5 < 0 if minorities are
disproportionately targeted by eminent domain and there is under-compensation. We report
the average and the individual coefficients. We consider n = 0 as a lag because some statistics
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refer to calendar year. Most of the effects appear with some slight delay so excluding n = 0
in joint significance tests does not affect our results.
In what follows, we report a mix of robustness checks along with the main results so the
reader can make their own judgment as to the most central findings. We are guided by an
ordering of presentation that verifies whether the “randomized control trial” works, after
which we would present additional outcomes and mechanisms using only the baseline model
(earlier drafts had many additional tables).
In principle, we have up to 1,632 experiments (34 years x 12 Circuits (x 4 quarters)).
With random treatment assignment, adding controls can add precision to the estimates if
the controls are strong predictors of the outcomes. We show (in Tables 4 and 5 and also in
the Appendix) that our main estimates are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of:
• Person-level age, gender, and educational attainment, and state-level fixed effects.
These enter as dummies with the exception of age.
• Characteristics of judges available to be assigned. We calculate the expectations based
on the composition of the Circuit pool of judges available to be assigned in any Circuit-
year assuming that all judges have an equal probability of assignment. Expected num-
ber of judges per seat is a proportion varying from 0 to 1. Senior judges sit less fre-
quently and we weigh their characteristics accordingly in calculating expectations. The
results are not sensitive to omitting senior judges and using the exact months in which
judges are appointed or retire to calculate their availability.
• Circuit-specific time trends to allow different Circuits to be on different trajectories
with respect to outcomes.
We also present a specification with four years of leads and one lag (n = −4 to 1).
For standard errors, as Barrios, Diamond, Imbens, and Kolesar (2012) write, “if the co-
variate of interest is randomly assigned at the cluster level, only accounting for non-zero
covariances at the cluster level, and ignoring correlations between clusters, leads to valid
standard errors and confidence intervals,” so we expect to see similar results whether clus-
tering standard errors at the Circuit or Circuit-year level (Barrios et al. (2012) show that
random assignment of treatment addresses serial and spatial correlation across treatment
units). Our results are also unaffected using the standard approach with U.S. data, 50 state
clusters (see Tables 4 and 5). Appendix Tables 4 and 5 also report regressions where each
datapoint corresponds to 1 experimental subject (34 years x 12 Circuits). We check results
using randomization inference that assigns the legal variation to another Circuit and the
robustness of our results to using wild bootstrap. In addition, the leads specification serves
as an omnibus check for insufficient adjustment of standard errors. A prior draft clusters
standard errors at the Circuit-year level and this draft clusters at the Circuit level, and the
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results are unchanged.13
3.4.1 Instrumental Variable Ascertaining a causal effect from judicial decisions to social
trends is difficult without idiosyncratic variation in judicial decisions. Since Lawct and ict
may be correlated due to uncontrolled-for social trends or other legal developments that
correlate both with Lawct and outcomes Yict, we develop an instrumental variable for Lawct
using judges’ biographical characteristics. We use biographical characteristics because the
number of eminent domain cases yields sharp demographic effects but not judge-specific
effects, as there are too few cases with which to identify judge-specific effects (there are
roughly 180 life-time appointed judges and only 134 cases). In this paper, we do not analyze
heterogeneity in terms of, e.g., early or late pro-takings decisions, or the compounding effects
of, e.g., pro-takings decisions, and we only analyze the average effects.
Judges with different conceptions of duty or empathy may render different decisions. In
particular, racial minority Democrats are more likely than racial minority Republicans to
have worked for the NAACP, a civil rights organization that advocates for racial minorities
and backed the Private Property Rights Protection Act. If the Act passes, a state or political
subdivision that exercises eminent domain for economic development would be cut off from
receiving federal economic grants for two years. Federal prosecutors have been found to be
politically and legally partisan, so we may expect Republican former federal prosecutors to
be primed to support business interests and favor government takings.
We develop an instrumental variable using judges’ shared biographical characteristics and
we will refer to the number of judges assigned to eminent domain panels with these charac-
teristics as Nct (we drop the subscript n to ease the exposition on the instrumental variables
construction).
If a Circuit-year has a higher fraction of pro-government judges (Nct/Mct) assigned,
the precedent for that year will be that much more pro-government. Were we only inter-
ested in the contemporaneous effect of Lawct, the moment condition for causal inference is
E[(Nct/Mct − E(Nct/Mct))εict] = 0. E(Nct/Mct) is the expected proportion of judges who
tend to be pro-property owner in takings cases. Figure 3 illustrates the identification strat-
egy. The jagged line displays Nct/Mct and the smooth line displays E(Nct/Mct) in each of the
12 Circuits. The smooth lines indicate the underlying variation in judge-specific character-
istics within Circuits over time. The jagged line indicates the random year-to-year variation
in racial minority Democrats per seat. We estimate how outcomes 4Y ict respond to idiosyn-
cratic variation in excess proportion, Nct/Mct − E(Nct/Mct).
Next, we construct an instrumental variable whose moment conditions are implied by the
original moment condition. Consider an instrument, pct−E(pct), where pct is the proportion
of judges who tend to be pro-property owner in takings cases and pct is defined as 0 when
13We thank our NBER discussant Bentley MacLeod for recommending for a related paper that we cluster
at the Circuit level.
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there are no cases:
(4) pct =
Nct/Mct if 1[Mct > 0]= 10 if 1[Mct > 0]= 0
Without loss of generality, Nct is the number of racial minority Democrats per seat in takings
cases in Circuit c and year t. These two conditional moment conditions imply E[(pct −
E(pct))εict] = 0 unconditionally: E[(pct−E(pct))εict] = Pr[Mct > 0]E[(pct−E(pct))εict|Mct >
0] + Pr[Mct = 0]E[(pct − E(pct))εict|Mct = 0] = 0. Furthermore, E[(pct − E(pct))εict] =
E(pctεict) − E[E(pct)εict] = E(pctεict) − E(pct)E(εict) = E[pctεict]. Thus, pct and pct − E(pct)
both serve as valid instruments. Notably, as Tables 4 and 5 and the Appendix show, the
results are unaffected by controlling for E(pct). As Table 2 shows, E(pct) is uncorrelated with
Lawct. These checks assuage concerns that E(pct) is correlated with outcomes (or correlated
with decisions in other areas of law that affect the outcomes we examine) in a manner that
drives our results.
This draft presents estimates using the following identification assumption (moment condi-
tion) for causal interpretation: E[Nct
Mct
εict|E(NctMct ), 1 [Mct > 0]] = 0. Early drafts obtained sim-
ilar results using E[Nctεict|E(NctMct ),1 [Mct > 0] ,Mct] = 0, which looks at the number of pro-
takings decisions controlling for the number of decisions, andE[Nctεict|E(NctMct ),1 [Mct > 0] , Qct] =
0, which controls for the size of the court docket and checks if pro-takings vs. pro-property
owner decisions had opposite-signed effects. For the reasons we outline next, checking for
opposite-signed effects is a poor test, and this motivates our current specification.
All lags and leads of Lawct are instrumented for in the actual implementation. As standard,
we also lag and interact the instruments as we lag and interact Lawct.
3.4.2 Interpretation of β1nLawc(t−n) + β2n1[Mc(t−n) > 0]: Dummying for the presence
of a case permits identification of additional counterfactuals.
• β1n captures the effect of pro-government precedent where the counterfactual is a pro-
property owner precedent.
• β1n + β2n captures the effect of pro-government precedent where the counterfactual is
no precedent.
• β2n captures the effect of pro-property owner precedent where the counterfactual is no
precedent.
3.4.3 Interpretation of 2SLS: In common law, hard cases are the compliers whose
decisions turn on the identity of the judge and they lack strong legal precedent. Hard cases
precede easy cases, which are the always/never-takers. Easy cases follow the legal precedent
established previously. Cases that reach the Courts of Appeals are the more challenging and
legally innovative cases. According to Courts of Appeals judges, 5–15% of cases are “legally
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indeterminate” and have no strong legal precedent (Edwards and Livermore 2008). These are
the cases where judges seek guidance, and at present, from policy arguments that speculate
about the consequences of a legal rule (Posner 1998; Breyer 2006; Abramowicz et al. 2011).
Ambiguity has been shown theoretically to cause polarization along partisan lines (Baliga et
al. 2013). Since judges follow precedent, the complier cases precede the always-taker/never-
taker cases.
At first glance, our 2SLS estimates capture only the effects of hard cases, and as typical in
the instrumental variables literature, the external validity is limited to the sets of cases likely
to respond to the instrument. On a second look, β1n captures the effect of hard cases n years
ago, which can be decomposed into delayed direct effects as well as the effects of subsequent
easy cases that cite these hard cases. That is,
∑∞
n=0 β1n =
∑∞
n=0 TOT
n
ct =
∑∞
n=0 LATE
n
ct even
though in general, we only know LATE and not TOT . Recall, TOT ≡ E[Y1i−Y0i|Ri = 1] =
E[Y1i − Y0i|R1i > R0i]Pr(R1i > R0i|Ri = 1) + E[Y1i − Y0i|Ri = 1]Pr(R1i = R0i = 1|Ri = 1),
where Ri indicates whether i received treatment, R1i > R0i indicates whether individual i is
a complier and R1i = R0i = 1 denotes an always-taker, under the assumption of no defiers.
Indirect inference suggests that the effect of hard eminent domain cases is largely through
cases subsequently not litigated or not published in Courts of Appeals: few cases occur per
Circuit-year and contemporaneous judicial composition is not correlated with subsequent
takings decisions in the Circuit. The absence of subsequent easy cases following prior hard
cases in the published record is not surprising since Courts of Appeals cases should bring
issues of new law. Litigants should settle the easy cases, even if they do not, judges should
leave easy cases unpublished. Since published cases are predominantly hard cases, they are
responding to biographical characteristics. In addition, the strong first stage suggests that
any bias that results from the presence of non-compliers is likely to be small. The bias
from non-monotonicity is given by Pr[Defier]
Pr[Complier]−Pr[Defier](β
Complier − βDefier), which is likely
to be small even if there are non-compliers, since the magnitude of the first stage is large
(the denominator grows and the numerator shrinks) using biographical characteristics as the
instrument.
More concretely, if a Circuit-year has a higher fraction of Republican former federal pros-
ecutors assigned, the precedent that year will be that much more pro-government. We are
interested in the subsequent effects of that precedent on government and economic outcomes.
We are able to do so because the identity of a judge on a case does not directly affect out-
comes except through the precedent. The court decision is taken as precedent by subsequent
courts. Also, judge identity do not predict stock prices at the time of resolution controlling
for the manner in which the case was resolved and judge identity do not predict stock prices
at the moment that judges are revealed (Badawi and Chen, 2014).
It is also worth noting that for Takings Clause jurisprudence, pro-government vs. pro-
property owner is the materially relevant legal doctrine for economic outcomes. A very in-
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teresting feature of the institutional setting, however, is that it is possible to assess this
hypothesis in conjunction with another. If there are other aspects of eminent domain doc-
trine that are sensitive to judges’ biographical characteristics, and if these other aspects
of eminent domain doctrine affect government and economic outcomes, we should observe
correlations between Circuit-year biographical characteristics not used in the first stage and
2SLS residuals. They are not, which suggests that the pro-government vs. pro-property owner
dimension of these cases is the primary channel through which eminent domain doctrine has
an effect or that other aspects of eminent domain doctrine are not polarized along judicial
demographic characteristics. An early draft of Chen and Sethi (2011) compared the effects
of sexual harassment law with gender discrimination law (since these areas of law are closely
related) in a specification that included both areas of law and instruments for each. The
data on these laws was collected by Sunstein et al. (2006). When each area of law was in-
strumented for by its assignment of judges, the addition of another area of law did not affect
the coefficient on the other area of law, which assuage concerns of leakage.
3.4.4 Interpretation of Experiment vs. Population: The population TOT of the
Circuit = (Experimental: TOT direct) * P(exposuredirect) + (TOT indirect of individuals) *
P(exposureindirect). The experiments estimate TOT direct for individuals. The known parame-
ters are TOTCircuit and TOT direct. The unknown parameters are TOT indirect and the probabil-
ities. If one’s priors are that P(exposuredirect) is small, then indirect exposure may be large.
For example, thought leaders may issue cues (Baum and Groeling 2009; Cohen 2003; Bul-
lock 2011; Clark et al. 2014) that shape perceptions after decisions (Dolbeare and Hammond
1968). Data limitations make it practically impossible to study all the channels through
which law has its effects, but Clark et al. (2014) finds significant use of Twitter after several
court decisions. We will present the results of an experiment where subjects are randomly
made aware of a recent Courts of Appeals decision.
3.4.5 Randomization Check According to interviews, each court implements random-
ization differently. In some Circuits, two to three weeks before the oral argument, a computer
program randomly assigns available judges to panels who will hear cases. In other Circuits,
judges are randomly assigned to panels up to a year in advance; cases that arise are ran-
domly assigned to panels. Some judges take a reduced caseload if retired or visiting, but all
are randomly assigned by a computer algorithm. Senior judges can opt out of death penalty
cases in some Circuits, but they would do so before random assignment. Chen and Sethi
(2011) formally tests for randomization by showing that case characteristics as determined
by District Courts are not correlated with the characteristics of the Courts of Appeals judges
assigned to the case.
Even if judges are randomly assigned, because our data comprise published opinions,
several additional issues need to be considered: settlement, publication, and strategic use of
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keywords or citation. In Courts of Appeals, judges are revealed very late, after litigants file
their briefs, sometimes only a few days before the hearing, if there is a hearing, which gives
little opportunity and incentive for settlement upon learning the identity of the panel. Most
of the litigation costs are sunk by that point, and when the D.C. Circuit began announcing
judges earlier, it did not affect settlement rates (Jordan 2007). Unpublished cases are not
supposed to have precedential value. Unpublished cases are deemed as routine and easy:
studies find that judicial ideology predicts neither the decision in unpublished cases (Keele
et al. 2009) nor the decision to publish (Merritt and Brudney 2001). To rule out strategic
use of keywords or citation of Supreme Court precedent, we propose an omnibus test to
collectively address deviations from strict exogeneity: we examine how similar the string of
actual panel assignments is to a random string, the details of which are developed in Chen
(2013). To see random strings as an omnibus test: Suppose racial minority Democrats publish
cases and other judges do not. In order for this to explain any effects, we should expect racial
minority Democrats to violate the random strings test.
We assess deviations from random assignment by examining whether the sequence of
proportions of judges is similar to a random process. Figure 3 suggests visually that panel
composition is not serially correlated. Formally, we:
1. Propose a statistic that can be computed from the sequence of numbers of racial
minority Democrats per seat within a Circuit.
2. Compute the statistic for the actual sequence, s∗.
3. Compute the statistic for each of 1,000 bootstrap samples from the actual sequence,
i.e., s1, s2, s3 . . .sn. Since there were changes in the expected number of racial minority
Democrats per seat over time, we treat our bootstrap samples as a vector of realized
random variables, with the probability based on the expectation during the Circuit-
year.
4. Compute the empirical p-value, pi by determining where s∗ fits into s1, s2, s3 . . .sn.
5. Repeat steps 1-4 and calculate pi for each unit.
We use the following statistics:
Autocorrelation: We see if the value in the jth case depends on the outcome in the
j-1thcase. This statistic can detect whether judicial assignments are “clustered,” meaning
a higher than expected number of back-to-back seat assignments to a particular type of
judge. This test tells us whether certain judges sought out eminent domain cases, perhaps
in sequence.
Mean-Reversion: We test whether there is any form of mean reversion in the sequence,
meaning that the assignment in the nth case is correlated with the assignment in previous
n−1 cases. This test tells us whether judges or their assignors were attempting to equilibrate
their presence, considering whether a judge was “due” for an eminent domain case.
Longest-Run: We test whether there are abnormally long “runs” of certain types of judges
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per seat. This test tells us whether certain Circuits may have assigned certain judges with
eminent domain cases during certain time periods, for example, to achieve specialization.
Number of Runs: Instead of simulating 1000 random strings, we compute the exact
statistic for number of runs. This test captures violations of randomization at the case level
rather than Circuit-year. In power calculations, this test has less Type II error compared
to the other tests. These random strings tests also have lower Type II error compared to
regression.
With a truly random process, the collection of all unit p-values should be uniformly
distributed. (Imagine that you generate summary statistics for 1000 random strings. The
1001th random string should have a summary statistic that is equally likely to be anywhere
from 1 to 1000.) A visual examination suggests that the empirical distributions for our
p-values for physical and regulatory takings approach the CDF of a uniform distribution
(Appendix Figure 1), which we formally test using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic from
an empirical null.
A final check of randomization is displayed in Appendix Table 2 Panel B. One or two years
before the true instrument, judicial decision-making is not correlated with future judicial
assignment.
Random strings test complements standard randomization checks (e.g., examinations of
(1) leads and (2) correlations between judicial composition and pre-determined case char-
acteristics). If pre-determined covariates occur randomly over time, checks of (2) miss non-
random serial correlation in judicial composition while the random strings test would miss
correlations between judicial composition and pre-determined covariates.
We also stack the strings across Circuits and across biographical characteristics and run an
autocorrelation test and compare the F statistic with F statistics generated from randomly
assigning available judges to cases. The results are consistent with randomization.
Other variations from random assignment include: remanded cases from the Supreme
Court are returned to the original panel; en banc cases that are heard by the entire pool of
judges (or a significant fraction in the Ninth Circuit); judges with conflict of interests opt
out after random assignment, which is extremely rare. We do not use remanded or en banc
cases, which are also relatively infrequent. Judges can also take sick leave or go on vacation,
but this is determined far in advance. Not accounting for vacation, sick leave, senior status,
en banc, remand, and recusal can lead to the inference that judges are not randomly assigned
(Hall 2010; Chilton and Levy 2015).
Our identification strategy—like the identification strategy of papers that use the patent
officer assignment or disability application reviewer assignment, which are not explicitly
random (Maestas et al. 2013; Galasso et al. 2015)—assumes that idiosyncratic deviations
from random assignment are ignorable. Even a gold-standard random process — the roll of
a die — has a deterministic element. If known with precision, the force and torque applied
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to the die, the subtle air currents, the hardness of the surface, etc., might allow us (or a
physicist) to determine with certainty the outcome of these “random” rolls. Despite this
obvious non-randomness, we would still have faith in the outcome of a trial with treatment
assignments based on die rolls because we are certain that the factors affecting the assignment
have no impact on the outcome of interest and hence are ignorable.
3.4.6 District Courts Litigants’ decision to appeal may respond to previous years’ legal
decisions, however, so controlling for 1[Mct > 0] may bias the coefficient for Lawct; the
bias is more severe for more distant lags and non-existent for the most advanced lead.
We assess whether this potential endogeneity is a significant concern by comparing β1(t−n)
when we instrument for 1[Mct > 0] using the random assignment of District Court judges.
District judge demographic characteristics are correlated with reversal rates in the Courts
of Appeals (Haire, Songer and Lindquist 2003; Sen 2015; Barondes 2010; Steinbuch 2009);
and expected reversal rates could encourage litigants to pursue an appeal. If 1[Mct > 0]
and Lawct are both identified, estimates should be roughly invariant to the inclusion or
exclusion of additional lags and leads (including lags that are important predictors of the
outcome improves statistical precision, but losing data at the beginning and end period
reduces precision) and lead coefficients being 0 provide an omnibus check of our instrumental
variable being endogenous to pre-existing trends.
District Courts assign one judge to a case randomly or rotationally (Taha 2009; Bird 1975).
Cases being returned on remand from the Courts of Appeals are not randomly assigned. We
do not use remanded cases in our dataset. For example, one District told us that random
assignment occurs within 24 hours of a case filing, which is handled in the order of its arrival.
Waldfogel (1995) reports that one District Court uses three separate randomization wheels
and each wheel corresponds to the anticipated case length. Related cases (meaning that one
decision will substantially resolve all cases), if filed within a few weeks, may be consolidated.
Waldfogel (1995) reports that plaintiffs can argue the case is related to another pending case
and, if the judge agrees, the cases will be consolidated. A clerk reported 8% of filed cases
were accepted as related in 1991 in SDNY. In another District Court, if a clerk identifies
and two judges agree that a new civil case is related to another open civil case, they will
be consolidated in the interests of justice or judicial economy. The clerk brings the possible
connection to the attention of the judge of the new case, who then confers with the judge
of the earlier case to determine whether they are in fact related cases. Consolidation would
only occur for relatively high-frequency case types, which does not include eminent domain.
For the handful of District cases that do overlap such that they are consolidated, we assume
the decisions about case relatedness occur in a manner exogenous to judge assignment.
To instrument for 1[Mct > 0], we define our District IV in two ways. Both definitions rely
on the random assignment of District Court judges and the fact that some are more likely
to be appealed than others. We use the first definition for data availability reasons, and
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we present the second definition if data were to become available in the future. In the first
definition, wct =
∑J
d=1 Kcdt∗
(
Lcdt
Kcdt
)
∑J
d=1Kcdt
, where Kcdt denotes the number of cases filed in District
court d within Circuit c at time t (J goes from 5 to 13 depending on the District). Lcdt
denotes the number of judges with a particular characteristic assigned to cases. The intuition
is that assigning District judges who are disproportionately appealed leads to an appeal in
the Circuit, 1[Mct > 0]. Note that this assumes Kcdt > 0. An approximation is to define
Kcdt ∗
(
Lcdt
Kcdt
)
as 0 if Kcdt = 0. Then, the instrument can be constructed if
∑J
d=1 Kcdt > 0,
which holds for both physical and regulatory takings.
In the second definition, w˜ct =
∑J˜
d˜=1Kcd˜t ∗
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
− E
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
))
, where d˜ denotes District
courthouse or court.14 A District Court has several courthouses (also referred to as Divisions)
and in some District Courts, random assignment is at the courthouse level. The second
definition does not rely on the exogeneity of the location of takings controversies, Kcd˜t. It
also does not rely on Kcd˜t > 0, though it still relies on
∑J˜
d˜=1Kcd˜t > 0. It is not possible
to merge courthouse location for most of the District Court cases (we tried to link the
courthouse information from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts database via the
docket number). This results in w˜ct being undefined in over 50% of Circuit-years and thus
requiring another dummying out for missing strategy. When we use w˜ct, we include a dummy
for missing values in w˜ct and define w˜ct to be 0 when it would otherwise be missing. In our
main tables, we use wct, but in the Appendix we also report estimates that use w˜ct for
robustness. The estimates are unaffected, which assuage concerns that the litigants’ decision
to appeal may respond to previous years’ legal decisions.
The ideal construction of w˜ct takes a weighted sum across wheels of deviation from expec-
tations, E
(
Lcd˜t
Kcd˜t
)
, separately for senior and non-senior judges. Senior judges can elect not
to be assigned to certain wheels. Another District Court uses, instead of wheels, thirteen
computer generated decks of cards–one deck for each case category and an identical number
of cards (two or five) for each active judge.15 The decks refill when the majority of the deck
has been exhausted. Senior judges can request to be assigned to certain decks. Even within
a deck, senior judges can ex ante request a “bye” for specialized case types. Within each Dis-
14
Fact The Law of Iterated Expectations (LIE) implies E
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∗ ct
)
= 0.
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Rearranging results in: E
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[(
L
cd˜t
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K
cd˜t
))
∗ ct
∣∣∣Kcd˜t]). Again by LIE:
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∣∣∣Kcd˜t] = E [E (( Lcd˜tK
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(
L
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K
cd˜t
))
∗ ct
∣∣∣ct,Kcd˜t) ∣∣∣Kcd˜t]. Rearranging
once again: E
[
ctE
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K
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− E
(
L
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K
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)) ∣∣∣ct,Kcd˜t) ∣∣∣Kcd˜t]. The expression Lcd˜tK
cd˜t
− E
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
)
is the devia-
tion of the ratio of judge assignment characteristics from the mean, so it should be independent of ct and
Kcd˜t. Therefore, E
((
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
− E
(
L
cd˜t
K
cd˜t
)) ∣∣∣ct,Kcd˜t) = 0.
15http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/cmecf/Order-for-Assignment-of-Cases.pdf
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trict Court are several courthouses (also referred to as Divisions). The appropriate Division
is determined by where the parties are located and where the cause of action arose. Some
Divisions get their own deck of cards. Taha (2009) reports that in 29 Districts, a case may
be assigned to any judge in that District, while in the others, the cases are assigned to a
geographic Division within the District and randomly assigned to one of the judges in that
Division.
However, since E
(
Lcd˜t
Kcd˜t
)
is uncomputable for senior judges since we would need to know
the senior “byes” in every District courthouse, we drop senior District judges for calculating
w˜ct; we also drop visiting (judges routinely visit other courts to assist with caseload) and
magistrate judges (they assist District Court judges but do not have life tenure and we do
not have their biographical data) for similar reasons, collectively resulting in less than 10%
sample loss. Non-ideological cases are referred to magistrate judges (Nash 2015), so omitting
them will not matter. Identification is unaffected by dropping judges even if they are in the
same wheel. Some courts spin separate random wheels for District judges and for magistrate
judges. In some Districts, parties can decline assignment to a magistrate judge within a
certain time period and request another random draw. This will not affect identification
because it happens before the random assignment that we use. In some Districts, when the
federal government is a litigant on the case, the U.S. attorney can pick the wheel. As stated
earlier, we do not include cases where the federal government is litigant as those cases would
go to the Federal Circuit.
Thus, conditional on case type, there is random assignment at the court or courthouse
level, and we must only calculate the yearly expected composition of judges in District
courthouses, E
(
Lcd˜t
Kcd˜t
)
, and we drop judges whose E
(
Lcd˜t
Kcd˜t
)
is unknowable in the robustness
check that uses w˜ct.
Unlike for Courts of Appeals cases, we cannot use the random strings test as an omnibus
assessment for violations of random assignment, because some Districts use rotational as-
signment or random drawing of judges from card decks without replacement. So we discuss
the concerns qualitatively and suggest another empirical test. First, District Courts judges
are revealed much earlier than Courts of Appeals judges. Ideally, we would use docket fil-
ings in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts pertaining to physical and regulatory
takings, but judges are omitted for most cases prior to 2000, so we must use published Dis-
trict opinions to construct our District IV. So, we buttress the assumption that settlement,
publication, and strategic use of keywords or citations are exogenous: 1) in District Courts,
judges are much more constrained and ideology has been found to play hardly any role. Ju-
dicial ideology does not predict settlement rates (Ashenfelter et al. 1995; Nielsen et al. 2010),
settlement fees (Fitzpatrick 2010), publication choice (Taha 2004), or decisions in published
or unpublished cases (Keele et al. 2009)—this last fact is consistent with the District judge
identity only affecting outcomes through the presence of an appeal but not through the Dis-
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trict Court decision, but this exclusion restriction is not necessary for the empirical analysis;
2) we examine these issues directly as follows.
Since the random strings test is ineffective for District Courts, we test whether District
Court judicial biographical characteristics in filed cases jointly predict publication. We link
PACER filing data, which has judge identity, to AOC data, which has information on publi-
cation. We obtained all freely available PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records)
data on District cases from 32 districts for 1980 to 2008 for a total of 359,595 non-duplicated
cases. This data contains the name of the District where the case was filed, the filing and
termination date (missing for 10% of cases), the assigned docket number, and the name of
the District or magistrate judge presiding on the case. We merge the names of the judges
into the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOC) database. We use LASSO to select
biographical characteristics and no characteristic was chosen. We assume that remaining
deviations from random assignment, like vacation days, are ignorable.
In sum, what is the difference between pro-government vs. pro-property owner precedent
and the difference between pro-government vs. no precedent? The U.S. Federal Courts effec-
tively randomize both the coin flip (pro-government vs. pro-property owner; what if Goldstein
v. Pataki had been decided in favor of the property owners?) and the presence of the coin
itself (pro-government vs. no decision vs. pro-property owner; what if Goldstein v. Pataki
did not exist?). They do so because the District Court judges are also randomly assigned,
which identifies an exogenous component of the presence of an appeal. However, our paper
is primarily interested in the coin flip itself rather than the presence of the coin, which is
addressed and analyzed in far more detail in Chen et al. (2014b), so we devote little space
to discussing the latter in the results that follow.
3.4.7 Many Instruments A large number of biographical characteristics serve as valid
instruments, which would result in a weak instruments problem if we used them all. Roughly
thirty characteristics that enter in levels (Democrat, male, racial minority, black, Jewish,
Catholic, No religion, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, bachelor’s degree (BA) received from
same state of appointment, BA from a public institution, JD from a public institution, having
an LLM or SJD, elevated from District Court, decade of birth (1910s, 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, or
1950s), appointed when the President and Congress majority were from the same party, ABA
score, above median wealth, appointed by president from an opposing party, prior federal
judiciary experience, prior law professor, prior government experience, previous assistant
U.S. attorney, and previous U.S. attorney), judge-level interactions (e.g., racial minority
Democrats), and panel-level interactions (e.g., fraction of judge seats assigned to Democrats
multiplied by fraction of judge seats assigned to racial minorities) yielding a total of several
thousand possible instruments.
There are two ways to reduce dimensionality: a priori theory and model selection. LASSO
(least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) is commonly used for model selection (Bel-
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loni et al. 2012). LASSO has sparseness and continuity, which OLS lacks. With OLS, large
subsets of covariates are deemed important, resulting in too many instruments, which makes
2SLS susceptible to a weak instruments problem. Small changes in the data result in dif-
ferent subsets of covariates deemed important. Formally, LASSO modifies OLS by adding a
data penalty for having too many large coefficients. The model minimizes the sum of squares
subject to the sum of the absolute value of the coefficients being less than a constant, which
tends to set some coefficients to exactly 0 and hence reduces model complexity.
The larger the set of IV candidates, the more severe the LASSO penalty. Reducing the
number of biographical characteristics by removing candidates that are over 99% correlated
with one another increases the possibility of selecting candidates. Candidate instruments
must have scores that satisfy a central limit theorem to reduce the chance that LASSO picks
up spurious signals. Dropping candidate instruments that deviate from its modal value16
with less than 5% frequency yields another threshold choice. We compare results with and
without LASSO model selection in Appendix Tables 4 to 8. We also report results from LIML
(limited information maximum likelihood), which is weak-instruments robust and uses all
the instruments.
In Appendix Table 8, we report the use of the Dantzig selector that accounts for corre-
lation in the IV candidates and thus results in a less severe penalty. We also employ the
following sensitivity check. With many endogenous variables and many instruments, there
is a danger of overfitting with instruments from the wrong year. In robustness checks, we
use the contemporaneous instruments to predict Lawc(t) and 1[Mct > 0] and use the fitted
values as instrumental variables in 2SLS.17
Chen et al. (2014b) develops another solution. It presents a visual Hausman test, which can
also be analogized to partial identification or set identification: the 2SLS results are visually
presented for a variety of instruments that have a strong first stage. It also proposes, imple-
ments, and compares a solution that omits 1[Mct > 0] altogether by defining Lawc(t−n) as
the average of -1/0/+1 (pro-property owner/no precedent/pro-government decisions). This
robustness check (also reported in Appendix Table 8) imposes the additional identification
assumption—that pro-property owner and pro-government owner decisions have opposite ef-
16The modal value is typically 0.
17To see how, suppose:
(5) Y ict = β10Lawc(t) + β11Lawc(t−1) + ...+ εict
Let the first stage be: Lc(t) = Z0Π0 + u0, where Z0 =
[
pc(t)
]
and Lc(t−1) = Z1Π1 + u1, where Z1 =[
pc(t−1)
]
. Set Xˆ = [ Lˆc(t) Lˆc(t−1) ... Lˆc(t−j) ]for j = 0, 1, ..., where Lˆc(t−j) = ZjΠˆj = Zj(Z′jZj)−1Z′jLc(t−j)
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fects of equal size in absolute value. Our main specifications do not impose this identification
assumption.
4 Results
4.1 First Stage: The Effect of Judge Identity on Court DecisionsThe Republi-
can party has traditionally been associated with business interests, which favor growth over
inequality, and libertarian interests, which disfavor government intrusion. These conflict-
ing perspectives complicate political lines on eminent domain. Simply being Republican or
Democrat does not predict eminent domain votes, which Sunstein et al. (2006) document and
we confirm. However, Republican former federal prosecutors have litigated on behalf of the
government and represent business and government interest, and they were 18 percentage
points more likely to uphold a physical taking from 1958-2008. Racial minority Democrats
have worked for the NAACP, a civil rights organization that advocates for racial minorities
and backed private property rights, and they were 20 percentage points more likely to strike
down a physical taking. These estimates are reported in Table 2 Columns 1 and 2. The
number of observations slightly differ because data on whether a judge was a former federal
prosecutor (U.S. Attorney) is sometimes missing.
In Column 3, we examine this relationship at the panel-level and include both biographical
characteristics in the specification. An additional minority Democrat on one of the 134
three-judge panels decreased the chances of a pro-government decision by 19 percentage
points while an additional Republican former federal prosecutor increased the chances of
a pro-government decision by 23 percentage points. The similarity in point estimates with
Columns 1 and 2 is consistent with their presence being pivotal. In Column 4, we examine
this relationship at the Circuit-year level for the 107 Circuit-years with at least 1 case. The
estimates indicate that an additional minority Democrat on a three-judge panel reduced
the proportion of pro-government decisions by 21 percentage points, while an additional
Republican former federal prosecutor increased the proportion of pro-government decisions
by 31 percentage points.
At this point in the table, we should expect some sensitivity across columns because the
effect of judge identity is analyzed at different levels of data aggregation in order to build
intuition. In particular, the Circuit-year level estimates differ from the case level since cases
are not evenly distributed across Circuit-years. For an example, suppose that there are 4
cases, one case each with 0, 1, 2, or 3 judges who are minority Democrat, and suppose
that the panel makes a pro-taking decision when there are 3 Republican former federal
prosecutors. If 1 Circuit-year has the case with 3 minority Democrats and the other Circuit-
year has the remaining 3 cases, the coefficient at the Circuit-year level is 0.5 (0.5 = difference
in percent pro-government/difference in minority Democrats assigned per seat) but when the
1 Circuit-year has the case with 2 minority Democrats, the coefficient at the Circuit-level is
1.5.
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In Column 5, we control for Circuit and time fixed effects, the expected proportion of
minority Democrats and Republican former federal prosecutors, and a dummy indicator for
whether there were cases, 1 [Mct > 0]. The number of observations increases to the complete
time-frame of 402 Circuit-years. The Eleventh Circuit was not founded until 1981, so the
Eleventh Circuit has 6 fewer observations than the other Circuits. The Eleventh Circuit was
created by splitting it off from the Fifth Circuit; Fifth Circuit decisions before this split
are considered binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. We account for this split in our
analyses by assigning pre-1981 precedent in the Fifth Circuit to observations in the Eleventh
Circuit.
The point estimates are essentially unaffected by these controls, and this stability is im-
portant. This stability indicates that the variation in Takings Clause jurisprudence is due
to the assignment of these judges and not fixed characteristics of the Circuit or time period
nor characteristics of the pool of judges available to be assigned. The F-statistic increases
slightly due to the controls, since the controls are predictive of the independent variable
(this can be seen in Figure 3), and the increase is not due to the increase in sample size from
dummying out for missing values. Redefining Lawct = Lawct ∗ 1 [Mct−n > 0], i.e., defined to
be 0 when 1 [Mct−n > 0] = 0, and regressing it onto the instrument pct = NctMct ∗1 [Mct−n > 0],
while including 1 [Mct−n > 0] as a control, neither affects the coefficient nor the F-statistic
on the joint significance of the biographical characteristics. Dummying out for missing values
is standard in the literature. The joint F-statistics of the two biographical characteristics are
above the weak instruments threshold.
When we weight our estimates by the number of cases in a Circuit-year, where weights
are the geometric mean of Mc(t−n) + 1 over the distributed lag, the statistical significance
of the results increases. We also show in Appendix Table 8 that our results have strong
Anderson-Rubin weak instruments-robust test statistics. We did not consider the solution
employed in Galasso et al. (2015), which uses the predicted estimate from the first stage as the
final instrument. Doing so would greatly increase the F-statistics, and Angrist and Pischke
(2008) suggests to avoid doing so in order to not obtain identification from functional form
assumptions. Thus, the first stage results should be interpreted as conservative estimates in
terms of statistical significance relative to these alternative methods.
Columns 6 and 7 report the first stage analyzed at the Fiserv-level. The coefficients differ
from those in Columns 4 and 5 because the Circuits do not contain the same number of zip
codes. Notably, the joint F-statistics of the two biographical characteristics are substantially
above the weak instruments threshold. The coefficients are similar moving from Column 6 to
7, re-confirming that we identify exogenous variation in Takings Clause jurisprudence due to
the assignment of these judges and not fixed characteristics at the Circuit or year level nor
characteristics of the pool of judges available to be assigned. Also, our inclusion of 1 [Mct > 0]
and dummying out for missing values do not bias our coefficients.
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To check whether our linear specifications miss important aspects of the data, Figure 4
presents nonparametric local polynomial estimates of the first stage. Estimation proceeds in
two steps. In the first step, we regress the proportion of decisions that were pro-government
on Circuit and year fixed effects and we regress the instrument on the same. Next, we take the
residuals from these two regressions and use a nonparametric local polynomial estimator to
characterize the relationship between the instrument and pro-government decisions. Figure
4 shows there is no flat relationship throughout the distribution. These figures also show
the tremendous variation across Circuits and years, which will be useful in estimating the
impact of Lawct.
While there is a large literature on physical takings, there is less on regulatory takings.
Since we have less by way of prior literature to guide us in determining biographical character-
istics that affect regulatory takings decisions, we employ LASSO in selecting the Circuit-level
instruments. There is also relatively little literature on the appeal of takings decisions, so
we also employed LASSO at the District level. The LASSO-selected instruments for Dis-
trict IVs are: (i) Born in 1920s and attended public institution for baccalaureate (BA) and
(ii) Evangelical * Born in 1940s with an F-statistic of 27.56 for Fiserv (Zip-Year); (i) Born
in 1920s and attended public institution for BA and (ii) Born in 1920s and above median
wealth with F-statistic of 9.15 for GDP (State-Year); and (i) Born in 1920s and attended
public institution for BA and (ii) Black Prior Law Professor with F-statistic of 29.00 for
CPS (Individual-Year). It is to be expected that the LASSO choice of instruments would
slightly differ since the time-frame of the data, level of aggregation, and weighting differs
slightly across outcome datasets. In any event, as we will see, employing both the District
and Circuit IV renders similar results as to employing only the Circuit IV.
4.2 Economic Growth: Property Prices and GDPFigure 6 displays our central
results—the effect of having pro-government Takings Clause jurisprudence on property prices
and GDP—and the central falsification test. In property prices, growth is 2% points higher
two years after pro-government takings precedent than after pro-property owner precedent.
In GDP, growth is 1% point higher two years after pro-government takings precedent than
after pro-property owner precedent. Null effects are displayed in the left-side of each pair of
graphs. The null effects assure that the growth effects of Takings Clause jurisprudence are
not due to secular trends in growth before the court decisions. The null effects are expected
since randomly assigned judges do not affect property prices and growth before they are
assigned.
Table 3 reports the average effect of pro-government Takings Clause jurisprudence over
the subsequent four years. In property prices, it is 1.2% points (p < 0.01) while in GDP, it
is 1.1% points (p < 0.01) (Panel A Column 2). The lead effects are an insignificant 0.3%
points and 0.2% points (Panel B Column 2). Column 1 reports OLS estimates, where the
lag effects are smaller and insignificant, while the lead effects are similar to the lead effects
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when instrumented. Downward bias in OLS estimates occur when judges make pro-takings
decisions when there is urban blight. Notably, the estimates are similar when instrumenting
for 1[Mct > 0] (Column 3).
Furthermore, the addition of Circuit-specific time trends (Table 4), removing Circuit and
year fixed effects, clustering standard errors at the state level, controlling for the expected seat
assignments to minority Democrats and Republican former federal prosecutors, weighting the
data using population weights, and dropping one Circuit at a time affect neither the size
nor significance of the impacts. Table 5 presents the full set of distributed lag coefficients
underlying the estimates of Table 4. They consistently show that the effects rise after the
first year and are strongest in the second year after the decision as seen in Figure 6. We also
checked robustness to lagged dependent variables, wild bootstrap (Appendix Table 3), and
clustering standard errors at the Circuit-year level.
The lower half of Table 5 shows that adding or subtracting a lag or two makes little
difference. Estimates are also robust to specifications containing 10 years of lags. Notably,
since the lags do not sum to 0, we observe growth rather than level effects. Panel B presents a
specification with four leads and 1 lag. The magnitudes of the leads are small and insignificant
as seen in Figure 6.
The larger effects on house prices than on GDP in Figure 6 are consistent with house prices
increasing due to over-investment or being more forward-looking relative to contemporaneous
variables like GDP. All estimates are subject to the usual caveats that causal effects are
sufficient, but not necessary conditions for an outcome (Deaton 2010). To illustrate, Chen
et al. (2016a) use a machine learning approach to analyze the effects of court laws and finds
that, of 18 factors that predict abortion attitudes, the court variables comprise 25-30% of
the sixth factor.
4.2.1 Further Robustness Note that Takings Clause jurisprudence has a growth impact
when the data is collapsed to 1 experimental subject per Circuit-year. Appendix Tables
4 and 5 collapse the data to the Circuit-year level using population weights. Appendix
Table 4 Column 6 shows that the average lag effect on property price growth is 1.3% points
(p < 0.01). The lead effect is an insignificant 0.6% points. Appendix Table 5 Columns 6 shows
that the average lag effect on GDP growth is 1.2% points (p < 0.01) and the lead effect is
an insignificant 0.2% points. Columns 7-9 of the tables show the results with alternative
specifications, where LASSO is used to instrument for Lawct and 1[Mct > 0] (Belloni et al.
2012). Columns 1-5 show the results using the full data. The tables in the main text report
Columns 1-3, as standard in the literature (Bertrand et al. 2004).
The estimates have similar size and significance as in the non-collapsed data. Appendix
Tables 4 and 5 lower half calculate the typical effects of Lawct taking into account how
many cases typically occur. The conditional effect refers to an effect conditional on a case
being in front of a judge. It is a scaling of β1. The unconditional effect includes the ef-
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fect of the presence of a case, β2. To compute the effect of pro-government precedent in a
typical Circuit-year, multiply the coefficient on Lawct by E[Lawct|1[Mct > 0]], the typ-
ical proportion of decisions that are pro-government when there are Circuit cases, and
by E[1[Mct > 0]], the proportion of Circuit-years with a Circuit case. To calculate the
typical effect of pro-government precedent taking into account the presence of an appeal:
1[Mct > 0]*E[1[Progovernmentct > 0]]+Lawct*E[1[Progovernmentct > 0]].
Appendix Tables 6 and 7 report the same set of robustness checks for GDP as Tables 4 and
5 did for property prices. Appendix Table 8 reports similar estimates with further sensitivity
checks. The instrument is pct − E(pct) rather than pct conditional on E(pct), the LASSO
penalty employs Dantzig selector to adjust for correlation among instrument candidates,
judges are dropped when we lack information about their expected assignment probability,
and separate first-stages are implemented to reduce over-fitting. Notably, the Dantzig selector
chooses minority Democrats and Republican prior U.S. Attorneys as instruments. Columns
4-5 define Lawct as the average of: +1: pro-takings and -1: pro-property owner.
4.2.2 Sectoral Impacts Table 12 provides prima facie evidence on the mechanisms. Phys-
ical takings jurisprudence that increased government power of eminent domain spurred an-
nual growth in the government sector by 0.3% points (p < 0.01), the transportation and util-
ities sector by 1.4% points (p < 0.01), and the construction sector by 3.9% points (p < 0.01),
as we expect with public infrastructure (Panel C Column 1). Eminent domain power also
contributes to annual growth in the sectors of agriculture by 5.7% points (p < 0.01); retail by
1.7% points (p < 0.01); and finance, insurance, rental, and estate by 2.2% points (p < 0.05).
Growth in the service sector is adversely affected by 9.2% points (p < 0.01).
Since the effects are observed outside of the government, transportation, and construction
sectors, we can be confident that the impact of Takings Clause jurisprudence is not due to
the local effect of allowing or disallowing a takings to proceed but due to the precedent that
gives more latitude to reassign property rights. That is, while some of these differences are
mechanical (allowing a physical takings to proceed directly leads to government spending,
property development, and GDP growth as an accounting matter), these sectoral results
suggest that the precedent set by the decision is more important than the decision on the
litigated government taking. Table 12 also reports calculations of typical effects. Statistical
significance come from the estimates of the coefficients, so significance tests are not repeated
to save space.
4.2.3 Local Impacts This inference is further supported in Table 5 Panel C. We use
zip code-level data to distinguish the local effect of eminent domain decisions affirming or
overturning a local taking from the precedential effect of making it easier for subsequent
takings. For example, following Midkiff, which allowed Hawaii to condemn property because
an oligopoly in land ownership was “injuring the public tranquility and welfare,” prices
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doubled within six years in the locality (Kanner, 2009; Roth, 1992).
(1) gict = θc + θt +
∑L
n=0 β7t−nLawct−n +
∑L
n=0 β8t−n1 [Mct−n > 0] +∑L
n=0 β9t−nLocalLawict−n +
∑L
n=0 β10t−n1[LocalMict−n > 0] + εict
We separately instrument Lawct and LocalLawict using judicial assignment in cases that
occur in zip code i and in cases that occur in Circuit c. The effects of eminent domain cases
are largely through their precedential power (0.7% points compared to 1% point when not
controlling for the local effects). We present every fourth quarter in the quarterly lags to
save space, but the means are the mean for quarters 0-16.
4.3 Economic Inequality: Racial Disparities and DisplacementGovernment power
of expropriation is perceived to have disparate impacts. Previous empirical studies also docu-
ment that low-valued land is undercompensated (Munch 1976; Chang 2010). Urban renewal
efforts have displaced hundreds of thousands of families and tens of thousands of businesses
(Garnett 2006). Racial minorities are not employed in the same numbers as those whose
homes or businesses are displaced by eminent domain. Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit awarded General Motors property, but it subsequently employed fewer peo-
ple than the combined employment of displaced businesses (Somin 2004). We use race to
proxy for inequality because of its salience (Semuels 2016) and because unobservables are
not rank-invariant to potential treatment status, so quantile regressions by price and income
are inappropriate. In particular, the same parcels that have relatively lower property prices
without pro-government precedent would not be the ones that would have relatively lower
property prices with pro-government precedent.
To the best of our knowledge, the only quantitative study on the distance that individuals
move when displaced through eminent domain, is a Canadian study showing that over half
move less than 3 miles when displaced and 99% move less than 15 miles (Sherwood, 1975).
Qualitative studies report that gentrification–which may or may not include eminent domain–
led to displaced persons moving within the same city rather than to a different city (LeGates
and Hartman 1982).
4.3.1 Displacement and Housing Every year, 10% of Americans make within-county
moves and 6% make out-county moves, according to the March CPS. Using this data (which
asks whether an individual moved within the county in the last year, whether an individual
moved outside the county in the last year, whether an individual lives in public housing, and
whether an individual lives below the poverty line) we find that pro-government physical
takings precedent increase within-county moves of racial minorities by 0.1% more than they
do of whites (Table 6). This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Non-whites
are no more likely to make moves from outside the county than whites after pro-government
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takings decisions. Whites were 0.2% more likely to make within-county moves and 0.007%
more likely to make out-of-county moves after pro-government takings decisions. No effect is
found before the decision (Panel B). A previous draft presents further analysis on the impact
on racial inequality. Racial minorities also became 0.3% more likely to live in public housing
and 0.7% more likely to live below the poverty line.
4.3.2 Employment Every year, 74% of whites are employed and 66% of non-whites are
employed.18 Table 7 reports that eminent domain power increased employment overall, which
is consistent with improved economic growth; to calculate: multiply the non-interacted aver-
age lag effect by 0.78 (the proportion white) and add the interaction effect multiplied by 0.22
(the proportion non-white). However, racial disparities increased as minorities were 1.7-2.1%
less likely to be employed than whites (p < 0.01, p < 0.05) (Table 7 Panel A Columns 2-3).
4.3.3 Condemnations With increased power of expropriation, we should see government
actors acquiring more parcels, providing less compensation per parcel, or taking more ex-
pensive property. In some jurisdictions, eminent domain is not authorized for residential
properties (Berliner and Coalition 2006). Business owners have noted that re-establishment
expenses are insufficient to cover increased rent and remodeling expenses associated with
displacement (Garnett 2006). Communities have reported concerns about job loss and trou-
ble attracting new businesses after the number of evicted businesses jumped from 39,000 in
1963 to 100,000 in 1971 (Frieden and Sagalyn 1991).
We examine state condemnations for federally funded transportation projects to measure
the behavioral response to government power of expropriation. Variables include: 1) aggregate
compensation for all parcels acquired per state-year whether through open market purchase,
condemnation, or administrative settlement; 2) aggregate parcels acquired per state-year; 3)
displacement and relocation costs.19 When courts are more likely to uphold a taking, we may
see governments exercising increased power of expropriation.
We find that land parcels are taken more frequently from businesses, despite their being
more litigious and expensive to displace than residential tenants. Table 8 reports that land
parcels were taken 12% more frequently from businesses (p < 0.01), but 7% less frequently
from residences (p < 0.05). Relocation costs of displaced business were 16% higher (p < 0.01),
but lower for displaced residences (p < 0.01). Because of the shift in the type of parcel taken,
compensation increased by 12.5% (p < 0.01) and number of parcels decreased by 10.3%
(p < 0.01). These estimates vary in magnitudes across specifications as they are estimated
in levels due to the time frame of the available data. No lead effects are found.
18These percentages come from MORG CPS. As standard in the literature, individuals who are unemployed
or not-in-labor force are counted as “not employed”.
19Displaced entities are eligible to receive reimbursements for moving and relocation expenses and the added
costs of becoming reestablished at the new location (separately for residential and commercial tenants).
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4.3.4 Highways Our highway data includes 2-digit highways (rays away from MSAs that
connect central business districts with regions outside the central city), 3-digit highways
(circles around MSAs that primarily serve urban areas), 2-digit federal highways (interstate
between MSAs), and planned highways. Table 9 shows that government power of expropria-
tion increased highway construction. Highway rays increased by 4% points (p < 0.1), highway
circles by 0.7% points (p < 0.01), and planned highways by 3.3% points (p < 0.05). Inter-
state highways did not increase significantly, but since interstate highways connect across
Circuits, the effects will be muted because Circuits face different treatments. Notably, the
broad-based growth across sectors in Table 12, especially for agriculture, is consistent with
the increase in highway rays connecting rural areas with central business districts.
5 Mechanisms
Even though the differences in government and economic activity seem to be aligned with
the differences in judges’ revealed preferences (some judges prioritize growth and economic
efficiency, while others prioritize equality and fairness), the results we have discussed so far
could potentially be attributed to other characteristics of eminent domain power. Expropri-
ation need not be total, but could be partial such as zoning, environmental regulation, or
flooding. In the U.S., this is called a regulatory taking and also is influenced by physical
takings precedent. One recent study finds that rezoning six neighborhoods increased total
employment by 12-21% and weekly wages by 8-13%, amounting to $269 million per year
(Busso et al. 2013).
5.1 Impact of Regulatory TakingsTables 11 and 12 report the effect of one dimension
of eminent domain power–the precedential effects of regulatory takings jurisprudence. The
full list of cases is displayed in Appendix Table 9. Table 11 reports the average effect of
pro-government regulatory takings jurisprudence over the subsequent four years. It is 0.2%
points in property prices (p < 0.01) and GDP (p < 0.05) (Panel A Column 2). The lead
effects are insignificant (Column 2). In contrast to physical takings precedent, there are no
significant effects on racial disparities in within-county moves or employment status (Panel
B) and no significant effects on displacements for federal transportation projects or highway
construction (Panel C). Panel D verifies that these results are not due to weak instruments.
Regulatory takings precedent is more frequent than physical takings precedent, so the scaled
effects taking into account the typical jurisprudence per Circuit-year yields similar effects
of both sets of jurisprudence (Table 12 Panels A and B). Table 12 Panel A reports typical
effects for physical takings jurisprudence and Panel B for regulatory takings jurisprudence.
Statistical significance come from the estimates of the coefficients so are not repeated to save
space.
Regulations do not necessarily lead to property development, and the construction or
transportation and utilities sectors were not significantly affected (Table 12 Panel C). How-
ever, pro-government regulatory takings precedent increased growth in the sectors of gov-
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ernment by 0.04% points (p < 0.05), services by 3.8% points (p < 0.01), finance, insurance,
rental, and estate by 0.3% points (p < 0.01), sectors associated with white-collar industries.
It decreased growth in the sectors of manufacturing by 0.9% points (p < 0.01) and wholesale
by 0.6% points (p < 0.05).
5.2 Perceived Takings Risk and InvestmentTOT may be further broken down be-
tween direct precedential and indirect expressive effects (Sunstein 1996; Chen and Yeh 2013,
2014b). Government actors are instructed to keep abreast of the latest laws, but investors
may only hear about laws indirectly. Simply hearing about a legal decision can shift people’s
preferences and experienced utility (Chen and Yeh 2014a) and mobilize individuals to donate
to campaigns (Chen et al. 2014b). Newspaper accounts of prominent decisions, such as Kelo
v. City of New London, made ordinary citizens feel vulnerable (Nadler et al. 2008).
We randomly expose data entry workers to newspaper articles summarizing Courts of
Appeals eminent domain decisions and assess whether perceived takings risk responds to
eminent domain decisions. The methodology is provided in more detail elsewhere (Chen
and Horton 2014; Shaw, Horton and Chen 2011; Chen 2011; Manski 2004). For eminent
domain, we ask whether legal decisions shift stated expectations. We hired 266 workers to
enter data. After completing the lock-in task (all workers completed 3 paragraphs involving
Tagalog translations of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations), workers in each of 4 treatment
groups and 1 control group were asked to transcribe abbreviated newspaper summaries of an
eminent domain decision that was either a regulatory or physical takings decision and either
a pro-government or pro-property owner outcome. The control group proceeded immediately
to the perceived takings risk question:
"What do you think is the probability that the government will deny you the right to use your
property (land or house or any other physical property) in a way that you want? Provide a number
from 0-100. A higher number indicates more certainty that the government will deny you your right.”
We paid subjects 10 cents to complete each paragraph; a paragraph takes about 100 seconds
to enter, so the offered payment was equivalent to $28.80 per day. To compare, the U.S.
federal minimum base wage for tipped waiters is $2.15/hour ($17.20 per day) and the fed-
eral minimum wage is $7.25/hour ($58/day). The exact paragraphs follow below. Original
newspaper articles are available on request.
1 of 3 Lock-in Tasks: Kaya sa isip o diwa na tayo ay sa mga ito, excites ilang mga antas ng
parehong damdamin, sa proporsyon ng kasiglahan o dulness ng kuru-kuro. Ang labis na kung saan
sila magbuntis sa kahirapan ng mga wretches nakakaapekto sa partikular na bahagi sa kanilang mga
sarili ng higit pa sa anumang iba pang; dahil sa takot na arises mula sa kathang isip nila kung ano
ang kani-kanilang mga sarili ay magtiis, kung sila ay talagang ang wretches kanino sila ay naghahanap
sa, at kung sa partikular na bahagi sa kanilang mga sarili ay talagang apektado sa parehong miserable
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paraan. Ang tunay na puwersa ng mga kuru-kuro na ito ay sapat na, sa kanilang mga masasaktin
frame, upang gumawa ng na galis o hindi mapalagay damdam complained ng.
Regulatory Pro-Property owner (Hamilton Bank of Johnson City v. Williamson Cty Reg. Plan-
ning (1984)): A local developer had received preliminary approval to develop houses on his land in the
Northern section of Williamson County, Tennessee. After the developer had incurred substantial costs
and developed most of the subdivision, the county changed its zoning ordinance. Hamilton Bank bought
the remaining acres of undeveloped land through foreclosure sale. It reapplied for permission to build
the full complement of houses, which the planning commission denied because of the new zoning regu-
lations. Claiming that the commission’s denial amounted to a taking of its property in violation of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, Hamilton Bank argued before a District
jury court that zoning regulation had rendered the land economically useless, and it would lose at least
$1 million because profits from the reduced number of houses would not even cover the costs of devel-
oping the land. The District Court found the commission’s regulations violated the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and awarded the bank $30,000. The US Court of Appeals upheld the
argument.
Regulatory Pro-Government (Rector, Wardens & Members of Vestry of St. Bart’s Church
(1990)): The Federal Court of Appeals upheld the landmark designation of St. Bartholomew’s Church
in New York City against a constitutional challenge by the Episcopal Parish. The parish argued that
landmark status interfered with its property rights. The church had applied for permission to demolish
its landmark Community House, to make way for a new office tower, income from which would support
church activities. However, in affirming a judgment by a lower court, the Second Circuit Court states
that the New York City Landmarks law did not violate the Church’s Fifth Amendment right against
government takings of property without just compensation, because the church had failed to prove that
it could not continue its religious practice in its existing facilities.
Physical Pro-Property owner (Hall v. City of Santa Barbara (1986)): The U.S. 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that a Santa Barbara’s mobile home rent control ordinance may violate the
U.S. Constitution by giving tenants an interest in landlord’s property without just compensation for
the landlords. The ordinance requires mobile park operators to offer their tenants leases of unlimited
duration, where the tenant may end the lease at will but the mobile home operator only for a cause
narrowly defined in the ordinance. Rent increases are also strictly limited. William and Jean Hall,
owner of Los Amigos Mobile Home Estates, a mobile home park within the City of Santa Barbara,
challenged the ordinance on the ground it effected a taking of their property and that such taking was
neither for a public purpose nor justly compensated.
Regulatory Pro-Government (Building Owners and Managers Ass’n Intern. v. F.C.C. (2001)):
A federal appeals court here has ruled that property renters have a right to install direct-broadcast
satellite dishes in locations under their control, even if such action is prohibited by a lease agreement
with the landlord. Real estate owners had sought to control renters’ ability to use their balconies
and patios as dish-installation sites. The Building Owners and Managers Association claimed that the
government’s protection of renters’ rights was against the Fifth Amendment prohibiting the taking of
private property without just compensation. The court however, rejected the argument.
We found that subjects exposed to any eminent domain decision increased their self-reported
takings risk by 10% relative to the control group that was not exposed to eminent domain
decisions (p < 0.05). Figure 7 displays the distribution of responses for the control group
and the treatment groups. Both OLS regressions and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for
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differences in distributions indicate that p < 0.05. Pro-property owner and pro-government
decisions had no significant difference.
Recall that β1 captures the effect of the heads-or-tails coin flip (pro-government vs. pro-
property owner precedent), β1 +β2 captures the effect of the heads coin flip and the presence
of the coin (pro-government precedent vs. no decision), and β2 captures the effect of the tails
coin flip and the presence of the coin (pro-property owner precedent vs. no decision). Table
10 Panel C presents calculations of β1 + β2 and their joint significance: 0.1-0.2% points for
property prices (p < 0.01) and GDP (p < 0.05).
In sum, these results suggest that the primary effects of Takings Clause jurisprudence is
through addressing a failure of Coasean bargaining–the difference in legal precedent that
expand or contract the actions that governments can take to reassign property rights, rather
than shifts in expectations. A full discussion of β2 is for another paper. In principle, we
can separately identify the effect of the presence of a case from the effect of pro-property
owner precedent in a high-frequency outcome dataset during the time window after a case
is announced and before the case resolution.
6 Conclusion
Our paper contributes to a literature on the long-run consequences of institutions such
as common law (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Dell 2010; La Porta et al. 1998), ongoing debates
on whether institutions are mainly products of economic or social determinism (Rosenberg
1993; Klarman 2004), and whether accidents, leaders, and decisions have significant impacts
on society (Banerjee and Duflo 2014).
We present a simple model of takings that clarifies competing views of the effects of gov-
ernment power of appropriation. It is frequently believed that a society that fails to protect
property rights against governmental restriction also fails to support rule of law and eco-
nomic growth (North and Thomas 1973; North and Weingast 1989; De Soto 2000). Our
model suggests that making it easier for the government to take property rights, even with
compensation, typically leads to lower economic growth because of distortion in investment
incentives, unless the public use channel dominates. If there are no public use benefits and
there is fair market compensation, a greater risk of takings has no effect on economic out-
comes. Introducing under-compensation, a greater risk of takings leads to under-investment
and lower property prices, and these investment distortions would invariably lead to lower
economic growth. Positive growth effects would be due to the benefits of public projects.
U.S. Federal Court judges articulating government power to reassign property rights have
important effects on government and economic activity. The effects of their decisions seem
to be largely attributable to a shift in government and economic activity directly relevant to
the preferences of the judges.
Minority Democrats assigned as judges under the Federal Court system decide eminent
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domain cases in a manner more closely linked to racial minorities’ concerns: minorities have
their property disproportionately taken and are undercompensated, and minority Democrats
are 20 percentage points more likely to vote to protect property rights. Republican former
federal prosecutors decide cases in a manner more closely linked to business and government
interests, and they are 18 percentage points more likely to vote to uphold government takings.
Using data on all U.S. takings precedent in Courts of Appeals, we show that rulings making
it easier to take physical property rights spur economic growth and property values, but
increase racial inequality as minorities become more likely to be unemployed and displaced.
Consistent with shifts in legal standard and a subsequent increase in actual government ac-
tivity, states displace larger and more expensive commercial tenants for federal transportation
projects and increase highway construction. Property values in the local zip code(s) where
the original takings occurred also increase. The economic growth impacts are concentrated
in the sectors of construction, transportation and utilities, and government, as one would
expect with physical takings, but also in agriculture, retail, and finance and real estate. In
contrast to physical takings precedent, decisions making it easier to regulate without having
to compensate affect neither condemnations for federal transportation projects nor racial
inequality in employment status nor displacement. Economic growth effects are smaller and
concentrated in the services, government, and finance and real estate sectors.
Decisions that expanded government power of expropriation increased government re-
assignment of property rights: local governments displaced larger and more expensive com-
mercial tenants for federal transportation projects and highway construction increased. GDP
and property values increased. But racial disparities also increased: minorities became more
likely to move and be unemployed relative to whites. Furthermore, results remain virtually
identical when including controls.
We show that interpreting the text in different ways impacted growth and inequality in a
manner consistent with the “Reverse Robin Hood” concerns that the notion of public use has
been instrumentalized to help the rich at the expense of the poor (Reinhart 2015). Moreover,
these findings have implications beyond eminent domain policy. Policies that improve mi-
norities’ bargaining power and access to courts may ameliorate some of the disparate impacts
of eminent domain.
Extrapolating these findings on government power of expropriation to other countries
needs caution. In the U.S., executive power is relatively constrained by the judicial and leg-
islative branches; moreover, there is a tradition of strong individual property rights, which
can lead to potential hold-up problems. For example, a U.S. property owner owns the oil that
is discovered under their own land, but the same is not true for most European countries.
Spending on public projects, e.g., 95$ billion is spent per year on place-based policies in the
U.S. (Kline and Moretti 2014), may be more likely with government power of expropria-
tion. Countries with potential for agglomeration, complementarities, fiscal multipliers, and
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transitions between steady states may also find large effects of eminent domain power.
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[7.72]
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[0.63]
Proportion of Circuit-Years with Physical Takings Panels 27%
Proportion of Pro-Government Physical Takings Decisions when Circuit-Year has Panels 66%
Expected # of Racial Minority Democratic Appointees per Seat when the 0.06
  Circuit-Year has Panels [0.06]
Expected # Republican Prior U.S. Attorneys per Seat when Circuit-Year has Panels 0.04
[0.06]
Number of Physical Takings District Cases 1.54
[1.96]
N (circuit-years) 402
Panel B: Regulatory Takings Cases (1979-2004)
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[7.46]
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[0.99]
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[1.55]
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Average of yearly lags P-value of lags P-value of leads
(1) (2) (3)
A. Add Circuit-Specific Trends 0.012 0.000 0.643
B. No Fixed Effects 0.006 0.002 0.209
C. State Cluster 0.012 0.000 0.408
D. Control for Expectation 0.017 0.000 0.350
E. Use Population Weights 0.015 0.000 0.521
F. Drop 1 Circuit
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  Circuit 2 0.010 0.000 0.456
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Table 4 - House Price Impacts -- Robustness of IV Estimates Across Controls
The Effect of Appellate Physical Takings Precedent on ΔLog Price Index
Notes: Significant at +10%, *5%, **1%. Data consist of Fiserv Case-Shiller/FHFA zip-code level price indices. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by Circuit. Regressions include Circuit fixed effects, 
year and quarter fixed effects, and a dummy for whether there were no cases in that Circuit-year. The baseline regression is an 
instrumental variables specification with one lead and four lags of appellate physical takings precedent, corresponding to 
column 2 in Table 2. Instruments for appellate physical takings are racial minority Democratics per seat and Republican prior 
U.S. Attorneys per seat assigned to physical takings cases in a Circuit-year. Expectation controls are the expected probability 
of being assigned a racial minority Democratic per seat and a Republican prior U.S. Attorney per seat in a Circuit-year. 
Population weights are based on the 2005 US Census estimates at the zip-code level.
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1. Add Circuit-Specific Trends 0.010 0.013 0.019 0.014 0.006
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
2. No Fixed Effects -0.000 -0.003 0.015 0.018 0.001
(0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006)
3. State Cluster 0.010 0.014 0.019 0.012 0.006
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4. Control for Expectation 0.016 0.021 0.023 0.015 0.010
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5. Use Population Weights 0.014 0.019 0.023 0.014 0.005
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Drop Circuit 5 0.012 0.013 0.019 0.015 0.004
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Drop Circuit 7 0.010 0.014 0.023 0.015 0.007
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Drop Circuit 8 0.010 0.013 0.018 0.013 0.005
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Drop Circuit 9 0.007 0.011 0.018 0.011 0.005
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Drop Circuit 10 0.011 0.015 0.019 0.012 0.006
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Drop Circuit 12 0.010 0.014 0.019 0.012 0.006
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7. 1 Lag 0.004 0.004
 (0.003) (0.003)
    2 Lags 0.004 0.010 0.016
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
    2 Leads, 4 Lags 0.010 0.016 0.018 0.010 0.004
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
    1 Lead, 5 Lags 0.011 0.012 0.017 0.014 0.003 -0.005
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Panel B: Yearly Leads (t1) (t0) (f1) (f2) (f3) (f4)
    4 Leads, 1 Lag 0.005 0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Panel C: Quarterly Lags (q0) (q4) (q8) (q12) (q16) Mean
1. Circuit-quarter laws 0.009 0.003 0.017 0.008 0.003 0.010
(0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
2. Circuit-quarter laws (Lawct) 0.009 -0.000 0.011 0.004 -0.000 0.007
       controlling for (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
    Local takings decision (LocalLawict) -0.018 0.014 -0.000 -0.013 0.010 0.005
(0.025) (0.022) (0.029) (0.040) (0.023)
Table 5 - Dynamic Housing Price Response
Notes: Data consist of Fiserv Case-Shiller/FHFA zip-code level price indices. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses and 
clustered by Circuit. The baseline regression includes Circuit fixed effects, year and quarter fixed effects, and a dummy for whether there were 
no cases in that circuit-year. Expectation controls are expected number of racial minority Democratic appointees per seat and expected number 
of Republican prior U.S. Attorneys per seat. Population weights are 2005 US Census pop. estimates by zip-code.
ΔLog Quarterly Price Index
A
ppellate and
Panel A
O
LS
A
ppellate IV
D
istrict IV
O
bs
N
on-W
hite
W
hite
Average Interaction Lag Effect
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
W
ithin-C
ounty M
ove in Last Year
0.001
0.001
0.001
3451505
0.115
0.090
Joint P-value
0.378
0.000
0.000
O
ut-C
ounty M
ove in Last Year
-0.001
-0.001
-0.002
3451505
0.062
0.061
Joint P-value
0.818
0.161
0.476
Average Level Lag Effect
W
ithin-C
ounty M
ove in Last Year
0.001
0.003
0.002
3451505
0.115
0.090
Joint P-value
0.011
0.298
0.000
O
ut-C
ounty M
ove in Last Year
-0.0003
-0.001
0.00007
3451505
0.062
0.061
Joint P-value
0.198
0.188
0.023
Panel B
Average Interaction Lead Effect
W
ithin-C
ounty M
ove in Last Year
0.006
0.010
0.022
3451505
0.115
0.090
Joint P-value
0.222
0.553
0.343
O
ut-C
ounty M
ove in Last Year
0.004
0.007
0.005
3451505
0.062
0.061
Joint P-value
0.240
0.025
0.123
Average Level Lead Effect
W
ithin-C
ounty M
ove in Last Year
-0.001
0.003
0.003
3451505
0.115
0.090
Joint P-value
0.401
0.180
0.321
O
ut-C
ounty M
ove in Last Year
0.001
0.001
-0.001
3451505
0.062
0.061
Joint P-value
0.338
0.498
0.814
Table 6 - D
isplacem
ent Im
pacts
N
otes: D
ata com
e from
 M
arch C
PS. H
eteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by C
ircuit. R
egressions include 
individual controls (age, race dum
m
ies, educational attainm
ent dum
m
ies, and a m
arital status dum
m
y), C
ircuit fixed effects, 
year fixed effects, C
ircuit-specific tim
e trends, and a dum
m
y for w
hether there w
ere no cases in that C
ircuit-year. 
M
ean D
ep. Variable
A
ppellate and
Panel A
O
LS
A
ppellate IV
D
istrict IV
O
bs
N
on-W
hite
W
hite
Average Interaction Lag Effect
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Em
ploym
ent Status
-0.015
-0.021
-0.017
6720948
0.655
0.742
Joint P-value
0.016
0.011
0.001
Average Level Lag Effect
Em
ploym
ent Status
0.005
0.012
0.010
6720948
0.655
0.742
Joint P-value
0.158
0.000
0.000
Panel B
Average Interaction Lead Effect
Em
ploym
ent Status
-0.019
-0.030
-0.018
6720948
0.655
0.742
Joint P-value
0.011
0.067
0.108
Average Level Lead Effect
Em
ploym
ent Status
0.004
0.005
0.002
6720948
0.655
0.742
Joint P-value
0.131
0.356
0.622
Table 7 - Em
ploym
ent Im
pacts
M
ean D
ep. Variable
N
otes: D
ata com
e from
 M
O
R
G
 C
PS. H
eteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by circuit. R
egressions include 
individual controls (age, race dum
m
ies, educational attainm
ent dum
m
ies, and a m
arital status dum
m
y), C
ircuit fixed effects, 
year fixed effects, C
ircuit-specific tim
e trends, and a dum
m
y for w
hether there w
ere no cases in that C
ircuit-year. 
O
LS
A
ppellate IV
A
ppellate and D
istrict 
IV
O
bs
M
ean 
D
ependent 
Variable
Average Lag Effect
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Log C
om
pensation
0.187
0.023
0.125
572
16.746
Joint P-value of lags
0.076
0.004
0.002
Joint P-value of leads
0.764
0.317
0.153
Log Parcels A
cquired
-0.003
-0.056
-0.103
663
6.456
Joint P-value of lags
0.043
0.000
0.000
Joint P-value of leads
0.223
0.462
0.660
Log R
esidential D
isplacem
ents
-0.134
-0.199
-0.065
663
3.508
Joint P-value of lags
0.195
0.129
0.044
Joint P-value of leads
0.451
0.758
0.608
Log R
esidential R
elocation C
osts
-0.156
-0.302
-0.091
663
12.587
Joint P-value of lags
0.282
0.087
0.000
Joint P-value of leads
0.053
0.164
0.191
Log R
eplacem
ent H
ousing C
osts
-0.251
-0.372
-0.126
663
12.357
Joint P-value of lags
0.316
0.011
0.120
Joint P-value of leads
0.229
0.103
0.583
Log C
om
m
ercial D
isplacem
ents
0.031
0.025
0.122
663
3.139
Joint P-value of lags
0.027
0.000
0.000
Joint P-value of leads
0.053
0.909
0.979
Log C
om
m
ercial R
elocation C
osts
0.099
0.138
0.163
663
12.117
Joint P-value of lags
0.088
0.012
0.009
Joint P-value of leads
0.800
0.581
0.638
Table 8 - Parcels A
cquired for Federal Transportation Projects Im
pacts
N
otes: D
ata com
e from
 FH
W
A
 (http://w
w
w
.fhw
a.dot.gov/realestate/49cfr24fr.pdf). H
eteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are 
clustered by C
ircuit. R
egressions include C
ircuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, a dum
m
y for w
hether there w
ere no cases in that 
C
ircuit-year. A
ll values are in logs of the underlying value plus one. D
ata range: 1991-2003, except com
pensation: 1995-2003.
O
LS
A
ppellate IV
A
ppellate and 
D
istrict IV
O
bs
M
ean 
D
ependent 
Variable
Average Lag Effect
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
ΔLog M
iles of 2-digit H
ighw
ays
0.000
0.029
0.040
7805
0.079
Joint P-value of lags
0.168
0.001
0.071
Joint P-value of leads
0.593
0.855
0.936
ΔLog M
iles of 3-digit H
ighw
ays
-0.003
0.012
0.007
7805
0.041
Joint P-value of lags
0.081
0.272
0.000
Joint P-value of leads
0.948
0.943
0.733
ΔLog M
iles of 2-dig Fed H
ghw
ys
-0.002
0.024
0.029
7805
0.085
Joint P-value of lags
0.017
0.040
0.704
Joint P-value of leads
0.838
0.666
0.962
ΔLog M
iles of Planned H
ighw
ays
-0.001
0.016
0.033
7805
0.072
Joint P-value of lags
0.034
0.398
0.034
Joint P-value of leads
0.831
0.194
0.151
Table 9 - H
ighw
ay C
onstruction Im
pacts
N
otes: M
SA
-level data com
e from
 B
aum
-Snow
 (2007). H
eteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by C
ircuit. 
R
egressions include C
ircuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, a dum
m
y for w
hether there w
ere no cases in that C
ircuit-year. 
A
ll values are in logs of the underlying value plus one. D
ata range: 1950-1993.
Panel A
O
LS
A
ppellate IV
A
ppellate and 
D
istrict IV
O
bs
M
ean 
D
ependent 
Variable
Average Lag Effect of Law
ct
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
ΔLog Q
uarterly Price Index
0.002
0.012
0.007
3989626
0.012
Joint P-value of lags
0.032
0.000
0.001
Joint P-value of leads
0.108
0.505
0.684
ΔLog A
nnual G
D
P
0.001
0.011
0.011
1671
0.066
Joint P-value of lags
0.254
0.000
0.009
Joint P-value of leads
0.890
0.810
0.453
Panel B
Average Lag Effect of Presentct
ΔLog Q
uarterly Price Index
-0.003
-0.010
-0.006
3989626
0.012
Joint P-value of lags
0.094
0.000
0.153
Joint P-value of leads
0.732
0.706
0.861
ΔLog A
nnual G
D
P
-0.002
-0.009
-0.010
1671
0.066
Joint P-value of lags
0.040
0.000
0.000
Joint P-value of leads
0.886
0.620
0.414
Panel C
Average Lag Effect of Law
ct  +
 Presentct
ΔLog Q
uarterly Price Index
-0.001
0.002
0.001
3989626
0.012
Joint P-value of lags
0.000
0.000
0.000
ΔLog A
nnual G
D
P
-0.001
0.002
0.001
1671
0.066
Joint P-value of lags
0.040
0.025
0.048
Table 10 - Im
pacts of D
ecisions (Including Presence of A
ppeals)
N
otes: D
ata consist of Fiserv C
ase-Shiller/FH
FA
 zip-code level price indices. State-level G
D
P data are from
 the B
ureau of 
Econom
ic A
nalysis. H
eteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by C
ircuit. R
egressions include C
ircuit fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, a dum
m
y for w
hether there w
ere no cases in that C
ircuit-year. 
Panel A OLS LASSO IV Obs
House Prices and GDP (1) (2) (3)
ΔLog Quarterly Price Index 0.002 0.003 2486744
Joint P-value of lags 0.086 0.000
Joint P-value of leads 0.005 0.333
ΔLog Annual GDP 0.005 0.002 1065
Joint P-value of lags 0.024 0.017
Joint P-value of leads 0.897 0.918
Panel B Obs Non-White White
Displacement
Within-County Move in Last Year 0.002 -0.002 2916474 0.118 0.091
Joint P-value of lags 0.003 0.692
Joint P-value of leads 0.816 0.194
Out-County Move in Last Year -0.000 0.002 2916474 0.063 0.061
Joint P-value of lags 0.031 0.000
Joint P-value of leads 0.523 0.316
Employment Status -0.011 0.004 5341620 0.660 0.750
Joint P-value of lags 0.169 0.958
Joint P-value of leads 0.115 0.476
Panel C
Log Residential Displacements 0.202 1.127 663
Joint P-value of lags 0.383 0.496
Joint P-value of leads 0.594 0.719
Log Commercial Displacements 0.203 -0.209 663
Joint P-value of lags 0.182 0.777
Joint P-value of leads 0.683 0.687
ΔLog Miles of 2-digit Highways 0.001 0.003 2453
Joint P-value of lags 0.529 0.636
Joint P-value of leads 0.113 0.401
ΔLog Miles of Planned Highways -0.000 -0.001 2453
Joint P-value of lags 0.000 0.163
Joint P-value of leads 0.097 0.796
Panel D Fiserv GDP CPS
First stage F-statistic
Appellate LASSO IV 48.36 37.48 50.39
District LASSO IV 6.53 6.43 11.51
0.56
Average Lag Effect
3.508
3.139
FHWA
30.01
9.24
Table 11 - Impacts of Regulatory Takings Precedent
Average Lag Effect
Average Interaction Lag Effect
Mean Dep. Variable
(4)
0.11
0.007
0.002
Physical Takings
Panel A
Effect of Law
ct
Average Lag Effect
(1)
(3)
ΔLog Q
uarterly Price Index
0.007
0.27
ΔLog A
nnual G
D
P
0.011
0.27
W
ithin-C
ounty M
ove in Last Year
0.001
0.27
  N
onw
hite-W
hite Inequality
Live in Public H
ousing
0.003
0.27
  N
onw
hite-W
hite Inequality
Em
ploym
ent Status
-0.017
0.27
  N
onw
hite-W
hite Inequality
Log R
eal W
eekly Earnings
-0.116
0.27
  N
onw
hite-W
hite Inequality
Log Federal C
om
pensation
-0.474
0.27
Panel B
R
egulatory Takings
ΔLog Q
uarterly Price Index
0.003
0.46
ΔLog A
nnual G
D
P
0.002
0.46
Panel C
Physical Takings
R
egulatory Takings
ΔLog Sectoral Annual G
D
P
Effect of Law
ct
Lags
Leads
Effect of Law
ct
Lags
Leads
C
onstruction
0.039
0.001
0.227
-0.016
0.145
0.405
Transportation and U
tilities
0.014
0.005
0.311
0.006
0.885
0.725
G
overnm
ent
0.003
0.002
0.470
0.0004
0.027
0.312
R
etail
0.017
0.001
0.768
0.002
0.152
0.274
A
griculture
0.057
0.000
0.674
-0.076
0.312
0.303
Finance, insurance, rental, estate
0.022
0.014
0.919
0.003
0.002
0.850
Services
-0.092
0.001
0.456
0.038
0.000
0.830
W
holesale
0.013
0.213
0.300
-0.006
0.033
0.756
M
ining
0.018
0.690
0.236
-0.062
0.735
0.465
M
anufacturing
0.007
0.784
0.169
-0.009
0.000
0.844
Table 12 - Im
pact A
nalysis
x       E(1[M
ct > 0])    =
Sectoral Im
pacts
Joint P-value
Joint P-value
x       E(Law
ct |M
ct > 0)
Typical Effect
(4)
0.78
0.66
0.66
0.001
0.002
0.0002
0.001
-0.003
-0.021
0.78
(2)
-0.084
0.001
0.001
0.66
0.66
0.66
0.66
0.66
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Map of Alleged Takings  
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Random Variation in Judicial Composition 
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Figure 4 – Local Polynomial Estimates of First Stage 
! !
!!
Nonparametric local polynomial estimates are computed using an Epanechnikov kernel. Rule-of-
thumb bandwidth is used. Shaded area indicates 90 percent confidence bands. The residuals are 
calculated removing circuit and year fixed effects. 
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Figure 5 – Number of Decisions !
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Figure 6: D
ynam
ic R
eponse to Takings Predecent 
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Figure 7: Perceived Takings Risk in Response to Eminent Domain Decisions !
!!
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Citation Case Name Circuit Year Pro-Property Owner
228 F.2d 280 U.S. v. Certain Parcels of Land in Fairfax County, of Va. 4 1955 1
229 F.2d 675 Anderson v. U.S. 5 1956 0
235 F.2d 864 District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency v. 61 Parcels of Land in Squares 12 1956 0
249 F.2d 811 Richmond Inv. Co. v. U.S. 9 1957 0
269 F.2d 546 Donnelly v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency 12 1959 0
287 F.2d 141 Paper v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency 12 1960 0
284 F.2d 221 Mamer v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency 12 1960 0
285 F.2d 628 U.S. v. Mischke 8 1961 0
296 F.2d 438 Leeaye, Inc. v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency 12 1961 0
310 F.2d 99 Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. Housing and Home Finance Agency 7 1962 0
302 F.2d 880 Maiatico v. U.S. 12 1962 1
322 F.2d 139 U.S. v. Agee 6 1963 0
316 F.2d 791 Harwell v. U.S. 10 1963 0
334 F.2d 229 U.S. v. 91.69 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Oconee County, State of S. C. 4 1964 0
328 F.2d 115 U.S. v. Cobb 9 1964 0
350 F.2d 356 2,953.15 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Russell County, State of Ala. v. U.S. 5 1965 1
347 F.2d 970 Maun v. U.S. 9 1965 1
350 F.2d 901 Wilson v. U. S. 10 1965 0
367 F.2d 768 U.S. v. Bowman 7 1966 0
367 F.2d 161 Southern Pac. Land Co. v. U.S. 9 1966 0
374 F.2d 218 West, Inc. v. U.S. 5 1967 0
395 F.2d 920 Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency 2 1968 1
390 F.2d 388 Scott Lumber Co. v. U.S. 9 1968 1
409 F.2d 932 Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal Dist. v. Henning 5 1969 0
432 F.2d 1286 U.S. v. 2,606.84 Acres of Land in Tarrant County, Tex. 5 1970 0
426 F.2d 955 Woodland Market Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland 6 1970 0
443 F.2d 104 U.S. v. 3,317.39 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Jefferson County, Ark. 8 1971 1
448 F.2d 980 U.S. v. 80.5 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Shasta County, State of Cal. 9 1971 0
456 F.2d 264 U. S. ex rel. and for Use of Tennessee Val. Authority v. Two Tracts of Land 6 1972 0
491 F.2d 301 U.S. v. 21.54 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Marshall County, State of W. Va. 4 1973 1
479 F.2d 404 U.S. v. 6,321 Acres of Land More or Less In Suffolk County 1 1973 0
478 F.2d 1055 U.S. v. 58.16 Acres of Land, More or Less In Clinton County, State of Ill. 7 1973 1
478 F.2d 484 U.S. v. 20.53 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Osborne County, Kansas 10 1973 0
514 F.2d 38 Gardner v. Nashville Housing Authority 6 1975 0
525 F.2d 450 U.S. v. 416.81 Acres of Land 7 1975 0
516 F.2d 1051 Maher v. City of New Orleans 5 1975 0
532 F.2d 1083 U.S. ex rel. Tennessee Val. Authority v. Two Tracts of Land 6 1976 0
561 F.2d 1327 Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency 9 1977 1
616 F.2d 680 Rogin v. Bensalem Tp. 3 1980 0
616 F.2d 762 U.S. v. 101.88 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in St. Mary Parish 5 1980 1
639 F.2d 6 John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell 1 1980 1
613 F.2d 1285 Stansberry v. Holmes 5 1980 0
665 F.2d 138 Devines v. Maier 7 1981 1
639 F.2d 299 U.S. v. 162.20 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Clay County 5 1981 1
694 F.2d 476 Barbian v. Panagis 7 1982 0
678 F.2d 24 National Western Life Ins. Co. v. Commodore Cove Imp. Dist. 5 1982 0
691 F.2d 474 U.S. v. 82.46 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Carbon County, Wyo 10 1982 0
718 F.2d 789 Amen v. City of Dearborn 6 1983 1
712 F.2d 349 Lower Brule Sioux Tribe of South Dakota v. U.S. 8 1983 0
702 F.2d 788 Midkiff v. Tom 9 1983 1
710 F.2d 895 Kohl Indus. Park Co. v. Rockland County 2 1983 0
748 F.2d 1486 Charles J. Arndt, Inc. v. City of Birmingham 11 1984 0
728 F.2d 876 Devines v. Maier 7 1984 0
746 F.2d 135 Park Ave. Tower Associates v. City of New York 2 1984 0
732 F.2d 1375 Story v. Marsh 8 1984 0
727 F.2d 287 Troy Ltd. v. Renna 3 1984 0
729 F.2d 402 Hamilton Bank of Johnson City v. Williamson County Regional Planning Com'n 6 1984 1
753 F.2d 1468 Robinson v. Ariyoshi 9 1985 1
770 F.2d 288 In re G. & A. Books, Inc. 2 1985 0
771 F.2d 44 Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. New York State Urban Development Corp. 2 1985 0
777 F.2d 47 Hilton Washington Corp. v. District of Columbia 12 1985 0
772 F.2d 1537 Florida Power Corp. v. F.C.C. 11 1985 1
764 F.2d 796 Rymer v. Douglas County 11 1985 0
771 F.2d 707 Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. Duncan 3 1985 0
779 F.2d 1553 Henley v. Herring 11 1986 1
797 F.2d 1493 Hall v. City of Santa Barbara 9 1986 1
781 F.2d 1349 Martori Bros. Distributors v. James-Massengale 9 1986 0
792 F.2d 1453 McMillan v. Goleta Water Dist. 9 1986 1
811 F.2d 677 Wood v. City of East Providence 1 1987 0
850 F.2d 1483 A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale 11 1988 1
844 F.2d 461 Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates 7 1988 0
847 F.2d 304 Calvert Investments, Inc. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer 6 1988 0
854 F.2d 591 Alliance of American Insurers v. Cuomo 2 1988 1
836 F.2d 498 U.S. v. 2,560.00 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Washington County 10 1988 1
850 F.2d 694 National Wildlife Federation v. I.C.C. 12 1988 1
868 F.2d 433 Wendy's Intern., Inc. v. City of Birmingham 11 1989 0
885 F.2d 1119 U.S. v. Frame 3 1989 0
Appendix Table 1: List of Physical Takings Appellate Precedent
Citation Case Name Circuit Year Pro-Property Owner
889 F.2d 1181 Duty Free Shop, Inc. v. Administracion De Terrenos De Puerto Rico 1 1989 0
898 F.2d 347 Pinewood Estates of Michigan v. Barnegat Tp. Leveling Bd. 3 1990 1
911 F.2d 743 Boston and Maine Corp. v. I.C.C. 12 1990 1
912 F.2d 467 Kurr v. Village of Buffalo Grove 7 1990 0
900 F.2d 1434 Oberndorf v. City and County of Denver 10 1990 0
922 F.2d 498 Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles 9 1990 0
902 F.2d 905 Centel Cable Television Co. of Florida v. Thomas J. White Development Corp. 11 1990 0
919 F.2d 593 Mountain Water Co. v. Montana Dept. of Public Service Regulation 9 1990 0
932 F.2d 51 Gilbert v. City of Cambridge 1 1991 0
940 F.2d 925 Samaad v. City of Dallas 5 1991 0
948 F.2d 575 Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles 9 1991 1
945 F.2d 594 Hughes v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co. 3 1991 1
978 F.2d 1269 Nixon v. U.S. 12 1992 1
953 F.2d 600 Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd. 11 1992 1
956 F.2d 670 Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Madigan 7 1992 0
980 F.2d 84 Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz 2 1992 0
985 F.2d 573 Pacific Power and Light Co. v. Surprise Valley Electrification Corp. 9 1993 1
997 F.2d 1369 Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes 11 1993 1
998 F.2d 680 Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert 9 1993 0
6 F.3d 867 AMSAT Cable Ltd. v. Cablevision of Connecticut Ltd. Partnership 2 1993 0
993 F.2d 962 Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation 1 1993 0
987 F.2d 913 Garelick v. Sullivan 2 1993 0
991 F.2d 1169 Media General Cable of Fairfax, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners 4 1993 0
5 F.3d 285 Gamble v. Eau Claire County 7 1993 0
37 F.3d 468 Carson Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson 9 1994 0
53 F.3d 338 Karagozian v. City of Laguna Beach 9 1995 0
57 F.3d 781 Hoeck v. City of Portland 9 1995 0
95 F.3d 1422 Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey 9 1996 1
101 F.3d 1095 Texas Manufactured Housing Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Nederland 5 1996 0
83 F.3d 45 Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. New York State Div. of Housing and Community 2 1996 0
107 F.3d 3 (Table) October Twenty-Four, Inc. v. Town of Plainville 2 1996 0
84 F.3d 865 Hager v. City of West Peoria 7 1996 0
85 F.3d 422 Broad v. Sealaska Corp. 9 1996 0
87 F.3d 290 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush 9 1996 0
89 F.3d 1481 Bickerstaff Clay Products Co., Inc. v. Harris County, Ga. By and Through Bd. 11 1996 1
93 F.3d 301 Porter v. DiBlasio 7 1996 0
95 F.3d 1359 Wisconsin Cent. Ltd. v. Public Service Com'n of Wisconsin 7 1996 0
105 F.3d 1281 Bay View, Inc. on behalf of AK Native Village Corporations v. Ahtna, Inc. 9 1997 0
124 F.3d 1150 Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu 9 1997 0
112 F.3d 313 McKenzie v. City of White Hall 8 1997 1
109 F.3d 1493 U.S. v. 0.59 Acres of Land 9 1997 0
153 F.3d 356 International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago 7 1998 0
147 F.3d 802 Garneau v. City of Seattle 9 1998 0
160 F.3d 834 South County Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Town of South Kingstown 1 1998 0
165 F.3d 692 Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Com'n 9 1999 1
187 F.3d 1324 Gulf Power Co. v. U.S. 11 1999 1
214 F.3d 573 John Corp. v. City of Houston 5 2000 1
216 F.3d 764 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 9 2000 0
230 F.3d 355 Milligan v. City of Red Oak, Iowa 8 2000 0
224 F.3d 1030 Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano 9 2000 0
226 F.3d 758 Montgomery v. Carter County, Tennessee 6 2000 1
31 Fed.Appx. 159 Kamman Inc. v. City of Hewitt 5 2001 0
266 F.3d 487 Anderson v. Charter Tp. of Ypsilanti 6 2001 0
254 F.3d 89 Building Owners and Managers Ass'n Intern. v. F.C.C. 12 2001 0
267 F.3d 45 Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly 1 2001 0
270 F.3d 180 Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation 5 2001 1
285 F.3d 142 Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo 1 2002 0
31 Fed.Appx. 19 West 95 Housing Corp. v. New York City Dept. of Housing Preservation 2 2002 0
288 F.3d 375 Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara 9 2002 0
306 F.3d 445 Daniels v. Area Plan Com'n of Allen County 7 2002 1
353 F.3d 651 Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill 9 2003 0
344 F.3d 959 Hotel & Motel Ass'n of Oakland v. City of Oakland 9 2003 0
57 Fed.Appx. 939 Jones v. Philadelphia Police Dept. 3 2003 0
316 F.3d 308 Tancredi v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 2 2003 0
342 F.3d 222 Borough of Columbia v. Surface Transp. Bd. 3 2003 0
97 Fed.Appx. 698 Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola 9 2004 0
374 F.3d 887 Cashman v. City of Cotati 9 2004 1
366 F.3d 1186 Garvie v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, Fla. 11 2004 0
361 F.3d 934 Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin 7 2004 1
363 F.3d 846 Chevron USA, Inc. v. Bronster 9 2004 1
411 F.3d 697 Warren v. City of Athens, Ohio 6 2005 1
419 F.3d 1036 M&A Gabaee v. Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles 9 2005 0
143 Fed.Appx. 439 Ash v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia 3 2005 0
434 F.3d 121 Brody v. Village of Port Chester 2 2005 1
464 F.3d 362 Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Tobe 2 2006 0
464 F.3d 480 Presley v. City Of Charlottesville 4 2006 1
Citation Case Name Circuit Year Pro-Property Owner
202 Fed.Appx. 670 Western Seafood Co. v. U.S. 5 2006 0
173 Fed.Appx. 931 Didden v. Village of Port Chester 2 2006 0
203 Fed.Appx. 70 U.S. v. 1,402 Acres of Land 9 2006 0
502 F.3d 616 St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago 7 2007 0
509 F.3d 1020 Action Apartment Ass'n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. 9 2007 0
474 F.3d 528 Cormack v. Settle-Beshears 8 2007 0
487 F.3d 941 Rumber v. District of Columbia 12 2007 1
497 F.3d 902 Vacation Village, Inc. v. Clark County, Nev 9 2007 1
516 F.3d 50 Goldstein v. Pataki 2 2008 0
2008 WL 2225684 Surf and Sand, LLC v. City of Capitola 9 2008 0
289 Fed.Appx. 232 Besaro Mobile Home Park, LLC v. City of Fremont 9 2008 0
547 F.3d 943 U.S. v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno County 9 2008 0
512 F.3d 1148 Matsuda v. City and County of Honolulu 9 2008 1
550 F.3d 302 Carole Media LLC v. New Jersey Transit Corp. 3 2008 0
distance size 90% 95% 99%
Autocorrelation 0.180666667 9 0.3392 0.3874 0.4795
Mean Reversion 0.318 8 0.3583 0.4097 0.5068
Longest Run 0.200888889 9 0.3392 0.3874 0.4795
distance size 90% 95% 99%
Autocorrelation 0.218333333 12 0.2958 0.3382 0.4192
Mean Reversion 0.215333333 12 0.2958 0.3382 0.4192
Longest Run 0.179 11 0.3083 0.3524 0.4367
Circuit-Year Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Racial Minority Democratic -0.701 -0.645 -0.694 -0.684
   Appointees per Seatt (0.220) (0.240) (0.211) (0.225)
Racial Minority Democratic 0.554 0.535
   Appointees per Seatt-1 (0.370) (0.362)
Racial Minority Democratic -0.525
   Appointees per Seatt-2 (0.276)
Racial Minority Democratic -0.0788 -0.0824
   Appointees per Seatt+1 (0.398) (0.394)
Racial Minority Democratic 0.306
   Appointees per Seatt+2 (0.581)
N 104 103 104 100
R-sq 0.077 0.089 0.064 0.057
Circuit-Year Level
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Judges with ABA scores of well- 0.335 0.328 0.261 0.262
   qualified or better per Seatt (0.139) (0.153) (0.154) (0.157)
Judges with ABA scores of well- -0.164 -0.159
   qualified or better per Seatt-1 (0.0912) (0.0913)
Judges with ABA scores of well- 0.0287
   qualified or better per Seatt-2 (0.137)
Judges with ABA scores of well- 0.0115 0.00911
   qualified or better per Seatt+1 (0.101) (0.106)
Judges with ABA scores of well- -0.00270
   qualified or better per Seatt+2 (0.111)
N 142 137 137 135
R-sq 0.217 0.208 0.209 0.207
Appendix Table 2 - Randomization Check
Regulatory Takings (Judges with ABA scores of well-qualified or better)
Panel A: P-Values from Kolmogorov Smirnov Test for Deviations from Uniform CDF
Notes:  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Observations are clustered at the Circuit 
level.  Proportions of pro-government takings decisions are set to missing in Circuit-years with no cases.
Panel B: Falsification Test of Instrument: Relationship Between Pro-Government Takings Decisions
 and Composition of Takings Panels in Other Years, 1975-2008
Outcome: Proportion of Pro-Government Physical Takings Decisionst
Outcome: Proportion of Pro-Government Regulatory Takings Decisionst
Physical Takings (Racial Minority Democrat Appointees)
Panel A
(f1)
(t0)
(t1)
(t2)
(t3)
(t4)
C
oefficient
0.005
0.011
0.018
0.008
0.011
0.007
Standard Error
(0.007)
(0.006)
(0.009)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.009)
M
ain percentile
0.452
0.077
0.046
0.205
0.148
0.472
W
ild B
ootstrap percentile
0.358
0.040
0.109
0.318
0.358
0.378
A
ppendix Table 3 -- W
ild B
ootstrap
N
otes:  State-level G
D
P data are from
 the B
ureau of Econom
ic A
nalysis. H
eteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by C
ircuit. 
R
egressions include C
ircuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, a dum
m
y for w
hether there w
ere no cases in that C
ircuit-year. W
ild bootstrap 
percentiles are displayed for 200 iterations.
ΔLog A
nnual G
D
P
D
ependent Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Proportion Pro-Taking
0.00402
0.00285
0.00166
-0.00212
-0.00258
0.00647
0.000831
0.00616
0.00379
   A
ppellate D
ecisionst+1
(0.00230)
(0.00428)
(0.00408)
(0.00703)
(0.0100)
(0.00492)
(0.00437)
(0.00387)
(0.00482)
Proportion Pro-Taking
0.00499*
0.00955+
0.0121**
0.0139*
-0.00000577
0.00860
0.0106+
0.0140**
0.0100*
  A
ppellate D
ecisionst
(0.00193)
(0.00557)
(0.00445)
(0.00647)
(0.00552)
(0.00583)
(0.00549)
(0.00447)
(0.00436)
Proportion Pro-Taking
0.00296*
0.0136**
0.0112**
0.00147
0.00353
0.0124*
0.0118**
0.0141**
0.00869*
  A
ppellate D
ecisionst-1 
(0.00133)
(0.00396)
(0.00364)
(0.00679)
(0.00490)
(0.00506)
(0.00399)
(0.00513)
(0.00428)
Proportion Pro-Taking
0.00330*
0.0190**
0.00872
0.00478
0.00507
0.0211**
0.0105
0.00985**
0.00567
  A
ppellate D
ecisionst-2 
(0.00133)
(0.00326)
(0.00566)
(0.00390)
(0.00804)
(0.00427)
(0.00681)
(0.00363)
(0.00539)
Proportion Pro-Taking
0.00159
0.0124**
0.00652
-0.00393
-0.000501
0.0196**
0.00906
0.00367
0.00256
  A
ppellate D
ecisionst-3
(0.00166)
(0.00410)
(0.00547)
(0.00749)
(0.00401)
(0.00617)
(0.00719)
(0.00444)
(0.00594)
Proportion Pro-Taking
-0.000393
0.00552**
-0.00342
0.00573
0.00291
0.00478
-0.00633
-0.001000
-0.00302
  A
ppellate D
ecisionst-4 
(0.00129)
(0.00165)
(0.00443)
(0.0107)
(0.00903)
(0.00420)
(0.00596)
(0.00280)
(0.00431)
A
ppellate IV
N
Y
Y
Lasso IV
Lasso IV
Y
Y
Lasso IV
Lasso IV
D
istrict IV
N
N
Lasso IV
N
Lasso IV
N
Lasso IV
N
Lasso IV
A
ggregation Level
Zip-Year
Zip-Year
Zip-Year
Zip-Year
Zip-Year
C
ircuit-Year
C
ircuit-Year
C
ircuit-Year
C
ircuit-Year
N
3989626
3989626
3989626
3989626
3989626
398
398
398
398
R
-sq
0.112
0.080
0.099
0.103
0.087
0.429
0.525
0.538
0.566
M
ean dependent variable
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.013
0.013
0.013
0.013
Average lag effect
0.002
0.012
0.007
0.004
0.002
0.013
0.007
0.008
0.005
   P-value of lags
0.032
0.000
0.001
0.101
0.883
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.000
   P-value of leads
0.108
0.505
0.684
0.763
0.797
0.189
0.849
0.112
0.432
Average lag of presence
-0.003
-0.01
-0.006
-0.004
-0.003
-0.01
-0.005
-0.006
-0.003
   P-value of presence lags
0.094
0.000
0.153
0.286
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.208
0.532
   P-value of unconditional
    (Law
ct  + 1[M
ct  > 0]) lags
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.015
0.060
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.029
Typical
   C
onditional effect
0.0004
0.0021
0.0012
0.0007
0.0004
0.0023
0.0012
0.0014
0.0009
   U
nconditional effect - pro
-0.0001
0.0005
0.0003
0.0001
-0.0001
0.0007
0.0004
0.0005
0.0004
   U
nconditional effect - anti
-0.0002
-0.0008
-0.0005
-0.0003
-0.0002
-0.0008
-0.0004
-0.0005
-0.0002
   U
nconditional effect - all
-0.0005
-0.0006
-0.0004
-0.0004
-0.0005
-0.0004
-0.0001
-0.0002
0.0001
N
otes: Significant at +10%
, *5%
, **1%
. N
otes: D
ata consist of Fiserv C
ase-Shiller/FH
FA
 zip-code level price indices. H
eteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by circuit. R
egressions include circuit fixed effects, year and quarter fixed effects, a dum
m
y for 
w
hether there w
ere no cases in that circuit-year. Instrum
ents for appellate regulatory takings are B
lack judges per seat assigned to regulatory takings 
cases in a circuit-year. Instrum
ents for appellate physical takings are D
em
ocratic m
inority appointees per seat and R
epublican prior U
.S. A
ttorneys per 
seat assigned to physical takings cases in a circuit-year.
ΔLog Price Index
A
ppendix Table 4 - Im
pact of Physical Takings Precedent on H
ouse Prices
D
ependent Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Proportion Pro-Taking
0.000911
0.00233
0.00506
0.0251
0.00760
0.00202
-0.00482
0.0897
-0.00486
   A
ppellate D
ecisionst+1
(0.00641)
(0.00969)
(0.00674)
(0.0187)
(0.0282)
(0.0115)
(0.00769)
(0.115)
(0.00631)
Proportion Pro-Taking
0.00410
0.00472
0.0114+
0.0241
0.0219
0.00274
0.00771
-0.0499
-0.000596
  A
ppellate D
ecisionst
(0.00411)
(0.00931)
(0.00648)
(0.0252)
(0.0247)
(0.0104)
(0.00593)
(0.0398)
(0.00987)
Proportion Pro-Taking
0.00287
0.0192*
0.0180*
0.0158
0.0134
0.0104
0.00429
0.0137
-0.00842
  A
ppellate D
ecisionst-1 
(0.00299)
(0.00849)
(0.00905)
(0.0176)
(0.0149)
(0.00721)
(0.00748)
(0.0139)
(0.0143)
Proportion Pro-Taking
0.00297
0.00994**
0.00836
0.0110
-0.00451
0.0167
-0.000318
0.0735
0.00659
  A
ppellate D
ecisionst-2 
(0.00377)
(0.00378)
(0.00659)
(0.0196)
(0.0377)
(0.0120)
(0.00740)
(0.0845)
(0.00900)
Proportion Pro-Taking
0.000282
0.0138*
0.0112
0.0157
0.00122
0.0194*
0.0128
-0.0468
0.0139
  A
ppellate D
ecisionst-3
(0.00337)
(0.00626)
(0.00775)
(0.0229)
(0.0365)
(0.00783)
(0.00813)
(0.0633)
(0.0107)
Proportion Pro-Taking
-0.00288
0.00528
0.00677
-0.0103
-0.0229
0.0114
0.00693
0.0443
-0.00736
  A
ppellate D
ecisionst-4 
(0.00342)
(0.00956)
(0.00940)
(0.0207)
(0.0280)
(0.0106)
(0.00898)
(0.0476)
(0.0102)
A
ppellate IV
N
Y
Y
Lasso IV
Lasso IV
Y
Y
Lasso IV
Lasso IV
D
istrict IV
N
N
Lasso IV
N
Lasso IV
N
Lasso IV
N
Lasso IV
A
ggregation Level
State-Year
State-Year
State-Year
State-Year
State-Year
C
ircuit-Year
C
ircuit-Year
C
ircuit-Year
C
ircuit-Year
N
1671
1671
1671
1671
1671
387
387
387
387
R
-sq
0.426
0.410
0.410
0.386
0.350
0.627
0.653
.
0.638
M
ean dependent variable
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.066
0.064
0.064
0.064
0.064
Average lag effect
0.001
0.011
0.011
0.011
0.002
0.012
0.006
0.007
0.001
   P-value of lags
0.254
0.000
0.009
0.012
0.205
0.001
0.484
0.136
0.824
   P-value of leads
0.890
0.810
0.453
0.181
0.788
0.860
0.531
0.434
0.441
Average lag of presence
-0.002
-0.009
-0.01
-0.011
-0.011
-0.009
-0.004
-0.007
-0.003
   P-value of presence lags
0.040
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.400
0.019
0.035
0.202
0.086
   P-value of unconditional
    (Law
ct  + 1[M
ct  > 0]) lags
0.040
0.025
0.048
0.029
0.651
0.085
0.427
0.696
0.693
Typical
   C
onditional effect
0.0002
0.0020
0.0020
0.0020
0.0004
0.0021
0.0011
0.0012
0.0002
   U
nconditional effect - pro
-0.0001
0.0005
0.0004
0.0002
-0.0014
0.0007
0.0004
0.0001
-0.0003
   U
nconditional effect - anti
-0.0002
-0.0007
-0.0008
-0.0009
-0.0009
-0.0007
-0.0003
-0.0006
-0.0002
   U
nconditional effect - all
-0.0004
-0.0005
-0.0007
-0.0010
-0.0026
-0.0003
0.0000
-0.0006
-0.0006
A
ppendix Table 5 - Im
pact of Physical Takings Precedent on Econom
ic G
row
th
ΔLog G
D
P
N
otes:Significantat+10%
,*5%
,**1%
.
State-levelG
D
P
data
are
from
the
B
ureau
ofEconom
icA
nalysis.
H
eteroskedasticity-robuststandard
errorsare
in
parentheses
and
clustered
by
circuit.R
egressions
include
circuitfixed
effects,yearand
quarterfixed
effects,and
a
dum
m
y
forw
hetherthere
w
ere
no
cases
in
thatcircuit-year.Instrum
ents
forappellate
physicaltakings
are
D
em
ocratic
m
inority
A
ppointees
per
seatand
R
epublican
Prior
U
.S.A
ttorneys
per seat assigned to physical takings cases in a circuit-year. 
Average of yearly lags P-value of lags P-value of leads
(1) (2) (3)
A. Add Circuit-Specific Trends 0.008 0.011 0.894
B. No Fixed Effects 0.001 0.031 0.903
C. State Cluster 0.011 0.002 0.763
D. Control for Expectation 0.013 0.002 0.556
E. Use Population Weights 0.009 0.000 0.683
F. Drop 1 Circuit
  Circuit 1 0.010 0.001 0.767
  Circuit 2 0.008 0.000 0.465
  Circuit 3 0.012 0.000 0.601
  Circuit 4 0.010 0.000 0.932
  Circuit 5 0.011 0.001 0.644
  Circuit 6 0.009 0.000 0.566
  Circuit 7 0.008 0.004 0.759
  Circuit 8 0.010 0.000 0.812
  Circuit 9 0.025 0.000 0.451
  Circuit 10 0.012 0.000 0.422
  Circuit 11 0.011 0.000 0.740
  Circuit 12 0.010 0.000 0.824
The Effect of Appellate Physical Takings Precedent on ΔLog GDP
Appendix Table 6 -- Impact of Physical Takings Precedent on Growth -- Robustness of IV Estimates Across Controls
Notes: Significant at +10%, *5%, **1%. State-level GDP data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are in parentheses and clustered by circuit. Regressions include circuit fixed effects, year and quarter fixed effects, a dummy for whether there were
no cases in that circuit-year. The baseline regression is an instrumental variables specification with one lead and four lags of appellate physical
takings precedent. Instruments for appellate physical takings are Democratic minority Appointees per seat and Republican Prior U.S. Attorneys per
seat assigned to appellate physical takings cases in a circuit-year. Expectation controls are the expected probability of being assigned a Democratic
minority appointee per seat and a Republic prior U.S. Attorney per seat in a circuit-year. Population weights are based on the 2005 US Census
estimates at the zip-code level.    
(t0) (t1) (t2) (t3) (t4) (t5)
A. Add Circuit-Specific Trends 0.002 0.015* 0.008+ 0.013+ 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009)
B. No Fixed Effects -0.017 -0.005 0.019* 0.012 -0.004
(0.022) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008)
C. State Cluster 0.005 0.019* 0.010+ 0.014* 0.005
(0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
D. Control for Expectation 0.006 0.023* 0.013** 0.015* 0.008
(0.012) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011)
E. Use Population Weights -0.001 0.014+ 0.016+ 0.015** 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007)
F. Drop 1 Circuit
Drop Circuit 1 0.001 0.019* 0.010** 0.012* 0.005
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010)
Drop Circuit 2 -0.002 0.019+ 0.011** 0.011** 0.003
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
Drop Circuit 3 0.008 0.021* 0.010* 0.017* 0.004
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009)
Drop Circuit 4 0.004 0.019* 0.009* 0.014* 0.005
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010)
Drop Circuit 5 0.006 0.024** 0.008* 0.011+ 0.007
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
Drop Circuit 6 0.002 0.019* 0.013** 0.012* 0.002
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
Drop Circuit 7 0.004 0.011* 0.008+ 0.015* 0.003
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Drop Circuit 8 0.008 0.015+ 0.008+ 0.013+ 0.004
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Drop Circuit 9 0.010 0.021 0.033* 0.031 0.030**
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.009)
Drop Circuit 10 0.006 0.020** 0.012** 0.014** 0.008
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Drop Circuit 11 0.006 0.021* 0.009* 0.014* 0.006
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010)
Drop Circuit 12 0.003 0.020* 0.010** 0.014* 0.004
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
G. Lag Structure
    1 Lag -0.003 0.007
 (0.009) (0.007)
    2 Lags -0.006 0.013* 0.009
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
    2 Leads, 4 Lags 0.005 0.018+ 0.010* 0.014** 0.005
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
    1 Lead, 5 Lags -0.000 0.020** 0.018** 0.017* 0.004 0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005)
    4 Leads, 1 Lag -0.000 0.002 0.004 -0.018* 0.006 0.004
     (t0, t1, f4, f3, f2, f1) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Appendix Table 7 -- Impact of Physical Takings Precedent on Growth
The Effect of Appellate Physical Takings Precedent on ΔLog GDP
Notes: Significant at +10%, *5%, **1%. State-level GDP data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by circuit. Regressions include circuit fixed
effects, year and quarter fixed effects, and a dummy for whether there were no cases in that circuit-year. The baseline
regression is an instrumental variables specification with one lead and four lags of appellate physical takings precedent.
Coefficients on the lags are shown here. Instruments for appellate physical takings are Democratic minority Appointees
per seat and Republican Prior U.S. Attorneys per seat assigned to appellate physical takings cases in a circuit-year.
Expectation controls are the expected probability of being assigned a Democratic minority appointee per seat and a
Republic prior U.S. Attorney per seat in a circuit-year. Population weights are based on the 2005 US Census estimates
at the zip-code level.  
Robustness of IV Distributed Lag Estimates Across Controls, Lag Structure, and Leads
A
ppellate IV
A
ppellate and 
D
istrict IV
LA
SSO
 IV
A
ppellate IV
LA
SSO
 IV
Average lag effect
0.00679
0.00280
0.00317
0.00296
0.000317
   P-value of lags
0.00350
0.0330
0.00000233
0.0547
0.00000171
Average lead effect
-0.00117
-0.00313
0.00439
-0.00250
0.00281
   P-value of leads
0.954
0.889
0.387
0.758
0.251
Average lag of presence
-0.00610
-0.00295
-0.00221
   P-value of presence lags
0.117
0.0402
0.00307
Average lead of presence
0.00239
0.00612
-0.00239
   P-value of presence leads
0.875
0.850
0.596
A
nderson-R
ubin test statistic
49.29
684.0
888.7
13.10
35.23
N
2295
2295
2295
2295
2295
R
-Sq
0.403
0.378
0.425
0.393
0.421
A
ppendix Table 8 - Im
pact of Physical Takings Precedent on G
row
th
R
obustness to A
lternative D
efinition of A
ppellate and D
istrict IV, Judge Sam
ple, LA
SSO
 penalty, and D
efinition of Law
 Law
ct  is %
 Pro-G
overnm
ent Taking Precedent
 Law
ct  is M
ean of Pro-G
overnm
ent (+1) 
and Pro-O
w
ner (-1) Precedent
Citation Case Name Circuit Year Pro-Property Owner
605 F.2d 1117 Willam C. H1s & Co. v. San Francisco 9 1979 0
613 F.2d 73 Chatham v. Jackson 5 1980 0
626 F.2d 966 FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. 12 1980 0
616 F.2d 680 Rogin v. Bensalem Twp. 3 1980 0
632 F.2d 1014 Union Carbride Agricultural Products Co. v. Costle 2 1980 0
653 F.2d 364 Amer. Sav. & Loan Asso. v. County of Marin 9 1981 1
652 F.2d 585 Couf v. De Blaker 5 1981 0
665 F.2d 138 Devines v. Maier 7 1981 1
643 F.2d 1188 Hernandez v. LaFayette 5 1981 1
666 F.2d 687 Melo-Tone Vending, Inc. v. US 1 1981 0
660 F.2d 1240 Minnesota by Alexander v. Block 8 1981 0
645 F.2d 701 Nance v. EPA 9 1981 0
694 F.2d 476 Barbian v. Panagis 7 1982 0
684 F.2d 1301 In re Aircrash in Bali 9 1982 1
669 F.2d 105 In re Ashe 3 1982 0
671 F.2d 432 Nasser v. Homewood 11 1982 0
686 F.2d 1327 PVM Redwood Co. v. USA 9 1982 0
718 F.2d 789 Amen v. Dearborn 6 1983 1
710 F.2d 1097 Frazier v. Lownes County, Miss. Bd. Of Ed. 5 1983 0
707 F.2d 524 Kizas v. Webster 12 1983 0
703 F.2d 1141 Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. 9 1983 1
706 F.2d 1130 Memorial Hospital v. Heckler 11 1983 0
707 F.2d 103 Ocean Acres Ltd. Partnership v. Dare Cty Bd. Of Health 4 1983 0
724 F.2d 1247 Peick v. Pension Ben. Guaranty Corp. 7 1983 0
711 F.2d 582 Price v. Junction 5 1983 0
718 F.2d 628 Rep. Indus. V. Teamster Joint Council No. 83 4 1983 0
749 F.2d 1396 Board of Trustees v. Thompson Bldg. Materials, Inc. 9 1984 0
734 F.2d 175 Coastland Corp. v. County of Currituck 4 1984 0
728 F.2d 876 Devines v. Maier 7 1984 0
739 F.2d 1562 Dirt, Inc. v. Mobile County Com. 11 1984 0
725 F.2d 695 Family Div. Trial Lawyers of Superior Ct - DC v. Moultrie 12 1984 1
729 F.2d 402 Hamilton Bank of Johnson City v. Williamson Cty Reg. Planning 6 1984 1
762 F.2d 1124 Keith Fulton & Sons v. NE Teamster & Trucking 1 1984 0
749 F.2d 541 MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara 9 1984 0
740 F.2d 792 Mountain States Legal Found. v. Clark 10 1984 1
700 F.2d 37 Park Ave. Tower Associates v. NY 2 1984 0
732 F.2d 312 Sadowsky v. NY 2 1984 0
736 F.2d 1207 Scott v. Sioux City 8 1984 0
765 F.2d 756 Sederquist v. Tiburon 9 1984 1
727 F.2d 1121 Silverman v. Barry 12 1984 1
739 F.2d 118 Terson Co. v. Bakery Drivers & Salesman Local 194 3 1984 0
727 F.2d 287 Troy Ltd. v. Renna 3 1984 0
749 F.2d 549 Trustees for Alaska v. US EPA 9 1984 0
771 F.2d 707 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan 3 1985 0
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